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INTRODUCTION
The list of top three [challenges] for wind industry I would say: transmission,
transmission and transmission.
1
-Texas Energy Stakeholder

It is impossible to talk about developing renewable energy
resources in the United States without also talking about developing
the
More specifically,
electric transmission infrastructure.
transmission-planning strategies that may have worked in the past
are no longer effective to integrate new sources of renewable energy
into the transmission grid. Transmission lines were historically built
to link large stationary power plants to nearby electricity demand
centers like cities. For renewable energy, however, state mandates
and policies are driving investment in wind-and to a lesser extent
solar-energy, creating a need for new transmission lines to link these
dispersed resources with electric load centers. Against this backdrop,
there is now a complex mix of federal, state, and regional laws,
policies, and politics governing both renewable energy goals and
transmission planning and siting. These developments have rendered

1.
Miriam Fischlein et al., States of Transmission: Moving Towards Large Scale Wind
Power, ENERGY POL'Y (forthcoming 2013).
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the traditional approach to transmission planning and siting
ineffective-and, in some cases, obsolete.
Although members of Congress have introduced bills to create
federal renewable energy standards and to create more federal
authority over transmission planning to support the growth of
renewable energy, most of the action remains at the state level. While
there has been significant scholarship on renewable energy siting and
development in the United States, there has been less emphasis to
date on the transmission challenges associated with the growth of
renewable energy. This focus is critical, however, because the success
of wind and solar development depends on whether it can get to
market cost-effectively, and much of that depends on transmission.
In this Article, we consider federal, state, and regional policies
governing transmission planning and siting and highlight the
challenges and opportunities for further growth. We focus on wind
rather than solar or geothermal resources because wind-based electric
power generation has grown significantly in recent years. There are
currently over 48,000 megawatts ("MW") of installed wind power, and
that scale is beginning to have a demonstrable effect on transmission
planning and decisions. 2 We limit our geographic focus to wind power
in states west of the Mississippi River because many of these states
have strong wind resources. Developing these resources, however,
requires multistate coordination for siting and building transmission
lines and cooperation from regional transmission organizations or
local utilities for integration with the grid. While not exhaustive, our
analysis seeks to illustrate the different conditions and demands of
wind development in those states. Finally, we do not analyze the
environmental and aesthetic concerns associated with developing
interstate transmission lines. For decades, environmental groups and
local landowners have opposed the development of many high-voltage
transmission lines because of their potential impact on scenic and
natural areas, endangered species, human health, and aesthetic
resources. We recognize the importance of these issues in developing
interstate transmission but do not expressly consider them in this
analysis.
Current policies to encourage renewable energy at the federal
and state levels will only be successful if accompanied simultaneously
by policies to plan, site, build, and operate long-distance transmission
lines that cross state and regional boundaries. However, in light of the
Industry Statistics, AM. WIND ENERGY
2.
industrystats/index.cfm (last updated Aug. 6, 2012).

ASS'N,

http://www.awea.orgflearnabout/
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current regulatory regime, which consists of small, highly devolved
decisionmaking infrastructures, there are significant obstacles
associated with creating large-scale systems that span many
jurisdictions. Some of these challenges include (1) transmission siting
and permitting structures that exist primarily at the state level; (2)
lack of robust federal authority or regional coordinating authority to
plan and site transmission infrastructure when states fail to approve
projects as a result of citizen opposition, politics, or cost; and (3)
difficulty in determining which electricity users should pay for new
transmission lines, particularly where those lines need to be built in
states with significant wind resources, small populations, and low
electricity demand.
Part I provides a brief background of the electricity
transmission system. It explains the different state and regional
transmission grids in the United States, the siting challenges faced in
attempting to build new transmission infrastructure, and the
challenges associated with integrating intermittent renewable energy
sources into grid dispatch operations. It then explores policies used to
develop renewable energy at the state, regional, and national levels,
including renewable portfolio standards, renewable energy credits,
feed-in tariffs, and other financial incentives. Part II provides detail
on specific laws, policies, and structures existing at the federal, state,
and regional levels to both encourage renewable energy generally and
site new transmission lines to accommodate growth in renewable
energy. In the state-level analysis, this Part considers groups of states
west of the Mississippi River as examples of how some states are
working alone or together to develop both renewable energy and
transmission, and reflects on these actions against the backdrop of
various theories of federalism. It also discusses some of the federalism
challenges endemic in the current framework of overlapping state,
regional, and federal authority that governs interstate transmission
line planning, siting, and operation. Part III discusses some options
federal and state policymakers might consider to support transmission
infrastructure for large-scale regional renewable resources in light of
current system challenges and opportunities. This Part concludes that
while federal preemption of state siting authority would eliminate
many roadblocks to transmission development, such preemption has
its own risks and so far has little political support. As a result, we
favor (1) a more limited "process preemption" approach to
transmission siting; (2) providing additional encouragement for states
to join interstate, regional compacts with permitting authority for
transmission; and (3) creating enhanced authority to spread the cost of
transmission over larger areas.
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I. RENEWABLE ENERGY AND THE ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION GRID

A. The ElectricPower Industry and the TransmissionGrid
The electricity industry grew from its beginnings in the 1882
New York financial district-with Thomas Edison's steam engines,
generators, and direct current wires providing electricity to light
shops and restaurants-into a critical backbone infrastructure for the
global economy.3 This country's electricity framework thus grew from
small and isolated independent systems into the large and
interconnected network of electricity transmission that today connects
electricity generators to consumers. The electricity industry can be
broken down into four parts: fuel, power generation, high-voltage
transmission of electricity over long distances, and distribution of the
power over lower-voltage systems to end users. In the United States,
electricity generation uses coal (42%), natural gas (25%), or uranium
(19%) to produce most of the 4.1 billion kilowatt-hours ("kWh") of
electricity. 4 Hydropower generates 8%, and the remaining renewables
generate just 5% of electricity. 5 Electricity is carried long distances
across the United States, with over 200,000 miles of high-voltage
transmission lines (230 kV or greater),6 crisscrossing the country and
linking into Canada and, to a lesser extent, Mexico. 7 From the highvoltage transmission grid, electricity is then "stepped down" to a lower
3.
RICHARD F. HIRSCH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING
IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 12 (1999).

Electricity Explained: Electricity in the United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
4.
(last
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity in.the-united_states
updated May 2, 2012).
5.
Id.
6.

Electricity

EDISON

Transmission,

ELECTRIC

http://www.eei.org/ourissues/ElectricityTransmission/Pages/default.aspx

INST.,

(last visited Aug. 19,

2012); see also REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE

65 (2011) [hereinafter "RAP"], available at http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/645
(discussing the nation's transmission system and defining "transmission" as lines that carry
power long distances at voltages of 115 kV (kilovolts, 1,000 volts) and above through big wires, as
compared to sub-transmission and distribution lines that carry power through smaller wires to
retail customers).
7.
Transmission lines have evolved into three major national networks (power grids): the
Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Texas Interconnection. These are
further subdivided into power pools, which have become the regional transmission organizations
("RTOs") or independent system operators ("ISOs"). "The major networks consist of extra-highvoltage connections between individual utilities designed to permit the transfer of electrical
energy from one part of the network to another. These transfers are restricted, on occasion,
because of a lack of contractual arrangements or because of inadequate transmission capability."
Electric Power Industry

Overview

2007,

U.S.

ENERGY

INFO.

gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).

ADMIN.,

http://www.eia.
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voltage either at a substation for delivery to consumers or at the
consumer location itself (residential 37%, commercial 34%, industrial
26%) on low-voltage distribution lines (less than 50 kV).8
In terms of sales, electricity is a multitrillion dollar business
with investor-owned utilities ("IOUs") selling 65% of generated
electricity, public municipal utilities selling 16%, rural electric
cooperatives selling 11%, and independent power producers selling
6%. 9 Electricity is often thought of as a "natural monopoly." 10 Until
recently, most of the industry remained vertically integrated: most
utilities owned large, centralized generation facilities, transmission
lines, and distribution lines and covered an exclusive service territory,
delivering electricity to customers for sales. Utilities established links
between service territories to help ensure a reliable power grid and to
facilitate bilateral electricity sales. In order to address the ability of
such natural monopolies to charge monopoly rates, states began to
regulate IOUs to ensure that they treated customers fairly and that
electricity rates remained "reasonable."1 1 This "regulator compact"
ensured an exclusive service territory to utilities in exchange for
reasonable electricity rates for captive customers.
The 1970s oil shocks, new regulatory requirements, and
increasingly contentious and expensive investments in nuclear power
with large cost overruns brought the traditional utility system under
greater public and regulatory scrutiny. 12 The passage of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA") included a
provision, section 210, which allowed independent electricity
producers with "qualifying facilities" access to the power grid and
electricity sales. This institutional change allowed the first renewable
resources (as well as combined heat and energy facilities) access to the
grid and began to change the central station model. Beginning in the
1990s, some states began to require utilities to submit "integrated
resource plans" to state public utility commissions to justify new

8.

Electricity Explained: How Electricity is Delivered to Consumers, U.S. ENERGY INFO.

ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplainedlindex.cfm?page=electricity-delivery
(last visited
Sept. 25, 2012); Electricity Explained: Use of Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplainedlindex.cfm?page=electricity-use (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).
9.
Electricity Explained: Electricity in the United States, supra note 4.
10. See RAP, supra note 6, at 3-6 (explaining how utilities in many parts of the country are
"natural monopolies" in that they are not required to compete with other utilities within their
service areas and are allowed by law to restrict output in exchange for serving the public interest
and allowing government regulators to set rates that will compensate utilities for their costs).
11. See HIRSCH, supra note 3, at 26-27 (discussing how and why the restructuring of the
electric utility industry from monopolistic to freewheeling competition occurred).
12. Id. at 66.
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infrastructure investments.' 3 These plans would require utilities to
estimate their projected electricity demand, generation resources, and
investments in new projects for four-, ten-, and/or twenty-year
planning periods on a least cost, "integrated basis," before new
projects are approved and integrated into the base rate for customers.
14
Twenty-eight states currently require integrated resource plans.
These plans require utilities to examine 'least cost" resource mixes
(including conventional generation as well as renewables, energy
efficiency, conservation, new transmission, and improvements to
existing facilities),' 5 while incorporating environmental factors, land
use factors, and economic and reliability factors into resource
planning.
Most states also delegate authority to state public utility
commissions to issue a certificate of need and a site or route permit to
build a new generation facility or transmission line. With regard to
transmission lines, this process generally considers how the line fits
with the state's resource planning, the need for the line based on
demand, a full evaluation of the environmental impacts of the line,
and the availability of alternatives. 16 Once a line obtains a certificate
of need (and in some cases a separate route permit), state statutes
generally empower the sponsor to exercise eminent domain authority
to construct the line if the line is unable to obtain voluntary
7
easements from landowners.'
In the early 1990s, many states began to restructure their
regulated utilities by splitting the vertically integrated utility
functions of generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity.
The desire for an efficient market-driven generation system, which
supporters promised would lower costs, spurred this transformation.
While troubles with the restructured market in California and the
Northeast prompted a partial re-regulation in some cases, the

13. See generally RAP, supra note 6, at 111 (explaining integrated resource planning).
14. Frederick Weston, Bd. Dir., Regulatory Assistance Project, Integrated Resource
Planning: History and Principles 15, Presentation at the 27th National Regulatory Conference
(May 20, 2009), availableat http://www.raponline.org/document/downloadlid/419.
15.

PORTLAND GEN. ELEC., ISSUES IN PERSPECTIVE: INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 1 (2010),

available at http://www.portlandgeneral.comlour_company/news-issues/current-issuesenergy
_strategy/docsirpissues-in-perspective.pdf.
16.

See Michael Dworkin et al., Energy Transmission and Storage, in THE LAW OF CLEAN

ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 531, 538 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011) (reviewing state
regulations on transmission siting).
17. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting
Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1019-22 (2009) (discussing state siting statutes, certificates of
need, and eminent domain authority for transmission lines).
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fundamental nature of the industry had been significantly altered.
Today, about half the states are still traditionally regulated (with
vertically integrated utilities) and the rest are restructured or
partially restructured.' 8 Regional transmission organizations ("RTOs")
and independent system operators ("ISOs"), voluntary organizations
created by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"),
manage the grid and regional markets for wholesale power for most of
the country's population. 19
All of these developments have occurred against the backdrop
of the physical structure of the transmission grid. In the contiguous
United States, there are three separate grids or subregions-the
Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the grid
serving Texas-yet most of the planning, siting, and approvals of
transmission lines are managed by state-level public utility
commissions. 20 Within each subregion, the electric network is highly
interconnected and interdependent, but there is virtually no capability
to move electricity between these three subregions. 2' The North
American
Electric
Reliability
Corporation
("NERC"),
a
nongovernmental organization, works with eight regional entities
which subdivide the grid even further to ensure bulk power
22
reliability.

18. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGULATION, AND
RESTRUCTURING
OF
U.S.
ELECTRICITY
MARKETS
9
(2002),
available
at

https://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/primer.pdf
(providing
introduction
to
utility
restructuring); Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructureelect.html (last updated Sept.
2010) (showing information on electric-industry restructuring).
19.

See Industries -

RTO/ISO, FED.

ENERGY REG.

COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/

industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Sept. 18, 2012) (map showing regional
transmission organizations).
20. See Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid
Integration, 28 ENERGY L.J. 147, 155 (2007) ("The United States power grid is made up of three
distinct sub-regions: the Eastern and Western Interconnects (roughly demarcated by the Rocky
Mountains), and Texas."); see also Visualizing the U.S. Electric Grid, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 24,
2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=l 10997398
(interactive
map
displaying transmission lines and energy infrastructure).
21. Blumsack, supra note 20, at 155.
22. Key
Players: Regional Entities, N. AM.
ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY
CORP.,
http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1 191119 (last visited Aug. 22, 2012); NERC: About NERC, N.
AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=l

2012).

(last visited Aug. 22,
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B. Renewable Energy Policy
In the absence of comprehensive federal policies to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and with few federal policies to require
renewable energy development, states have taken an active role in
23
developing their own policies to promote renewable energy.
Historically, just a small fraction of electricity produced in the United
States was generated from renewable energy sources. From 1989 to
2004, non-hydropower renewable energy generated just 2% to 2.5% of
all electricity produced. 24 Most of this electricity was generated from
biomass combustion, municipal solid waste, and geothermal energy,
with solar and wind comprising a small fraction. 25 After 2005, growth
in renewable energy-primarily wind power-increased significantly,
with non-hydropower renewable energy in 2011 accounting for 5% of
all electricity nationwide and over 10% in several states.26
Thirty-eight states currently have adopted renewable portfolio
standards ("RPSs"), alternative energy portfolios, or voluntary goals to
spur additional renewable energy development. 27 There is significant
state-by-state variation within the adopted RPSs; which policy
instruments states choose to use and who is held accountable for
meeting the binding or nonbinding targets varies greatly.28 Many
states have additional policies to promote renewable energy* such as
renewable energy credits ("RECs"), 29 feed-in tariffs, tax incentives,
30
and taxes.

23. See Barry Rabe, States on Steroids: The Intergovernmental Odyssey of American Climate
Policy, 25 REV. POLY RES. 105 (2008) (discussing factors that have contributed to state primacy
in renewable energy policy).
24. MIRIAM FISCHLEIN, RENEWABLE ENERGY DEPLOYMENT IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR:
THREE ESSAYS ON POLICY DESIGN, SCOPE, AND OUTCOMES 5 (2010), available at http://

conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/99640/1/Fischlein umn_0130E1 1598.pdf.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Frequently Asked Questions: What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http:lwww.eia.govltools/faqslfaq.cfm?id=427&t=3(last updated June 26,
2012); Shares of Electricity Generationfrom Renewable Sources Up in Many States, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5750.

27. Renewable and Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
(last updated
SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/sites/default/modules/usmap/pdf.php?file-5907
Aug. 2, 2012).
28.

FISCHLEIN, supra note 24, at 2-3.

29. Id. at 29.
30. See Eric Lipton & Clifford Krauss, A Gold Rush of Subsidies in the Search for Clean
Energy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/1l/12/business/energyenvironment/a-cornucopia-of-help-for-renewable-energy.html (highlighting the funding of new
wind and solar power through tax breaks and government grants and loans).
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State RPSs usually require a specified percentage of electricity
sales, measured in megawatt-hours ("MWh"), or generation capacity,
measured in MW, to be from renewable sources. Typically RPSs
require that by 2020 or 2030, 15% to 25% of electricity sold in the
state is to be produced by a renewable energy source. 3 1 However, the
renewable technologies allowed and electric utilities required to
participate in the programs can vary widely. Some states-just
twelve-include only IOUs under their RPSs, while others also include
rural electric cooperatives or municipal utilities; other states, such as
Oregon and Michigan, make exclusions based on size or sales
capacity. 32 Scholars have documented that, on average, RPSs cover
86% of electricity sales, but some states cover much less. For example,
Illinois covers only one-third of electricity sales. 33 Which resources are
eligible to be counted under an RPS vary too. Some states allow
existing renewable resources to be included; others only count new
generation capacity. Some states allow large hydropower facilities to
be included, while others do not.34 Some technologies, like geothermal
power, tidal energy, or even wind power, simply do not exist in certain
35
parts of the country.
Some states allow utilities to purchase RECs from other states
to meet their RPSs, while others require in-state renewable
generation. 36 RECs allow utilities to fulfill their statutory obligations,
potentially at lower cost, by purchasing the environmental benefit of
renewable energy out of state. RECs are tradable certificates that
create a separate market for the environmental benefit of renewable
energy. RECs can be sold with the electricity (bundled) or separately
(unbundled). Of the states with RPSs, twenty-one allow use of RECs,
with use capped in an additional four states. Because neighboring or
nearby states may have lower-cost renewable development, utilitypurchased RECs can have a significant impact on renewable energy
deployment in neighboring states, and drive the need for additional

31.

FISCHLEIN, supra note 24, at 7.

32. Id. at 21.
33. Id. at 21-22.
34. Id. at 22.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 29. Tradable RECs are not permitted in AZ, CA, NV or WI; they are capped in KS,
NC, OR, UT, but allowed in CO, CT, DC, DE, HI, MA, MD, ME, MI, MN, MO, MT, NH, NJ, NM,
OH, PA RI, TX, VT, and WA. Id. Because Iowa has a capacity goal, and Illinois and New York
require central procurement of renewable energy, these states do not use tradable RECs. Id.
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regional transmission projects. 3 7 This illustrates why states are not
renewable energy islands, and a regional approach to renewable
development and transmission planning is important for widespread
renewable development.
C. Challenges of Wind Power
Because electricity cannot be easily stored, the generated
electricity must match electricity demand. Unlike the traditional
forms of energy such as coal or natural gas, wind energy is variable in
that wind turbines only produce power when the wind blows. 38 While
small amounts of wind energy can be integrated into the existing grid,
large amounts of wind energy in the system require new approaches to
manage and integrate variable wind power on the grid. This challenge
can be addressed by (1) providing backup reserves, like natural gas
plants, which can quickly ramp up if the wind stops blowing; (2)
developing energy-storage systems such as pumped hydro; (3)
developing wind power in more widespread geographic areas within a
connected grid; or (4) improving the predictive power of wind models.
In the Midwest Independent System Operator ("MISO") service
territory, there are ongoing operational experiments aimed at making
wind a "dispatchable intermittent resource" 39 by bidding wind power
forecasts into the day-ahead electricity market and then truing up the
estimated amount of wind power ten minutes before dispatch.
Moreover, as the best wind resources are often located far from
electricity demand centers, bringing wind resources to market
involves an expansion of the electric transmission grid. While the
"first generation" of wind was often sited where transmission capacity
was available, "second-generation" wind development will require new
transmission lines that connect areas of commercially viable wind
resource to the grid. Just as importantly, unlike coal, natural gas, oil,
and other traditional sources of electric power that can be transported
37. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how California's renewable energy mandates are
driving development of wind power and transmissions in other states in the region such as
Washington, Oregon, and Utah).
38. See Matthew L. Wald, New Rules and Old Plants May Strain Summer Energy Supplies,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12business/energy-environment
/new-rules -and-old-plants-may-strain-summer-energy- supplies.html (discussing intermittency
problems with wind power).
39.

MIDWEST

ISO,

MKT.

SUBCOMM.,

DISPATCHABLE

INTERMITTENT

RESOURCE

https://www.midwestiso.org/Library
available
at
(2011),
GUIDE
IMPLEMENTATION
/RepositoryfMeeting%20MateriaV/Stakeholder/MSC/201 1/20110301/2011 0301%20MSC%20Item%
2012a%20DIR%201mplementation%2oUpdate.pdf.
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to demand centers by rail, truck, or pipeline, wind resources can
currently be transported to demand centers only through transmission
lines. This makes the expansion of the transmission grid absolutely
critical to a significant increase in the utilization of wind resources in
this country.
Building these transmission lines will be costly. For example,
the transmission system upgrades necessary to integrate planned
renewable energy projects in the Western Interconnection are
estimated to cost at least $200 billion. 40 Different visions of how the
grid will evolve range from a "supergrid" constructed with ultra-highvoltage wires spanning North America to regional upgrades of the grid
for specific projects to better connect renewable resources to areas
with an unserved demand for electricity. 4 1 The ultimate architecture
of the grid will shape the future role of renewable energy within the
electric system.

II. TRANSMISSION LAW AND POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
BUILDING THE GRID AND ADDING RENEWABLE ENERGY

This Part first explores the extent of the federal government's
involvement with renewable energy development and transmission
line siting on federal and nonfederal lands, and discusses recent FERC
initiatives to promote transmission line projects to facilitate
renewable energy development. It shows that Congress has given
FERC only limited authority over the siting of transmission lines that
are not on federal lands and, for the most part, stakeholders and the
courts have thwarted recent efforts by FERC to exercise its siting
authority. This Part then turns to the states, which have been active
in setting renewable energy policy in recent years and which currently
exercise the bulk of authority over transmission line siting and cost
allocation. Because the majority of on-shore wind resource potential in
the United States occurs in the Great Plains region and in parts of the
western and southwestern United States, 42 this Part focuses on some
of the states west of the Mississippi that have been active in
40. Jeff St. John, Tres Amigas Raises Money for US Grid Super-Hub, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/tres-amigas-raises-money-for-u.s.grid-super-hub/.
41. See STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40511, ELECTRIC POWER
TRANSMISSION:
BACKGROUND
AND
POLICY
ISSUES
10
(2009),
available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/122949.pdf (providing background information on
electric power transmission and related policy issues before the 11 1th Congress).
42, Utility-Scale Land-Based 80-Meter Wind Maps, WIND POWERING AM., http://www.
windpoweringamerica.gov/windmaps.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
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developing wind energy capacity and consumption. Specifically, we
focus on wind energy and transmission line siting in three key regions:
(1) Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa in the Midwest; (2) Oregon
and California in the West; and (3) Texas. To examine the successes
and challenges seen in the various states, we also review recent
renewable energy-related transmission projects found in the selected
states and regions. Throughout the state-level discussion, we consider
principles of federalism and the difficulty states have experienced in
acting as their own "laboratories of democracy" in interstate
transmission development. Then, after discussing state policies and
challenges, this Part provides some additional context for this
discussion by looking at a few, select regional entities responsible for
operating the transmission grids within some of the selected states.
A. FederalRenewable Energy and TransmissionPolicy
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
("ARRA") "allocated $4.5 billion to modernize the Nation's
4
transmission grid," with specific directions to build a smart grid. 3
Congress has also "provided significant funding to support broader
multiregional planning efforts extending beyond individual utilities or
system operators." 44 More recently, the Obama Administration has
created an Interagency Rapid Response Team for Transmission
("RRTT") to better coordinate the siting of interstate transmission
lines to "increase electric reliability, integrate new renewable energy
into the grid, and save consumers money."45 The RRTT announced in
October of 2011 that it will attempt to expedite the permitting and
construction of seven transmission line projects through Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, New Mexico, Nevada, Wyoming, Utah,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Oregon, and Wisconsin by attempting to
more closely coordinate state and federal review processes. 46 The
43. Debbie Swanson & Meredith M. Jolivert, DOE Transmission CorridorDesignations &
FERC Backstop Siting Authority: Has the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Succeeded in Stimulating the
Development of New TransmissionFacilities?,30 ENERGY L.J. 415, 460 (2009).
44. John R. Norris & Jeffery S. Dennis, Electric Transmission Infrastructure:A Key Piece of
the Energy Puzzle, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 2011, at 3, 28.
45. Interagency Rapid Response Team for Transmission, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL.
QUALITY,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administrationeop/ceq/initiatives/interagency-rapidresponse-te am-for-transmission (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).
46. Id. The seven projects, several of which are discussed in this Part are: (1) Cascade
Crossing, about 200 miles of high-voltage transmission lines proposed by Portland General
Electric from Boardman, Oregon to Salem, Oregon; (2) Boardman-Hemingway, a 300-mile, 500
kV line proposed by Idaho Power from Boardman, Oregon to Melba, Ohio; (3) Gateway West,
proposed by Idaho Power and Rocky Mountain Power, for 1,150 miles of new high-voltage lines
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transmission lines were selected from lists produced through ARRA47
funded stakeholder processes.
Despite these efforts to provide federal financial support and
streamlined approvals, it is the states that have taken the lead in
establishing most renewable energy policies in the United States and
are the primary actors with regard to transmission line siting. As a
result, "the nation's transmission grid is an interconnected patchwork
of state-authorized facilities." 48 For the most part, each state manages
its own siting procedures for transmission lines, with some regional
cooperation and limited federal oversight, and then interacts with the
RTOs and ISOs, when applicable, with regard to grid management. In
recent years, Congress has attempted to exercise more authority over
transmission to increase grid reliability and accommodate growth in
renewable energy, but these efforts have had limited success, as
discussed below.
1. Federal Statutes Governing Transmission Line Siting
The Federal Power Act of 1935 ("FPA") provides the "statutory
foundation for regulating the business of transmitting and selling
electricity across state lines." 49 Congress has since transferred these
responsibilities to FERC.50 The FPA grants FERC jurisdiction over
interstate transmission of electricity and the wholesale sale of
electricity in interstate commerce. 51 FERC has no authority to

between Idaho and Wyoming; (4) Transwest Express, a 700-mile, 600 kV new transmission line
to bring new wind generation from Wyoming to Utah and Las Vegas, proposed by Transwest
Express LLC; (5) SunZia Transmission, two 500 kV lines starting near Ancho, New Mexico and
ending near Coolidge, Arizona, proposed by a consortium of southwest utilities called SunZia; (6)
Hampton-Rochester-Lacrosse, a 345 kV line from Hampton, Minnesota to near Alma, Wisconsin,
plus two 161 kV lines proposed by the CapX2020 utility group; (7) Susquehanna-Roseland, a 145mile, 500 kV line from Pennsylvania to New Jersey, proposed by two New Jersey utilities. Lynn
Garner, Federal Agencies Select Seven Projects for Fast-Track Transmission Siting Process, 194
DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) A-10 (Oct. 14, 2011).
47. See Interagency Rapid Response Team for Transmission, supra note 45 (detailing
background, goals, and next steps for RRTT).
48. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
FERC does not have jurisdiction when a state commission withholds approval of a permit
application for over one year).
49. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18-20 (2002) (discussing FERC jurisdiction over
transmission and wholesale sale of electricity under the FPA); Frederick R. Fucci, Distributed
Generation, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 345, 348 (Michael B.

Gerrard ed., 2011) (describing the FPA).
50. Fucci, supra note 49, at 348.
51. Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 535; see also New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5-8
(discussing development of a federal transmission system, the FPA's grant of authority to what
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regulate electricity that is generated and consumed intrastate (Texas,
for example, does not import or export electricity). Moreover, although
the FPA gives FERC jurisdiction over the transmission of electricity
across state lines, that authority does not extend to the siting of
transmission lines (either interstate or intrastate), which remains
within the purview of the states. 52 The FPA also grants FERC
ratemaking authority, and section 205 of the FPA prohibits "undue
preferences or discrimination and requires that any rates, charges, or
classifications be 'just and reasonable.' "53 If a rate is not reasonable,
FERC may order a new rate. This statutory framework, although
modified in the 1970s, still forms the basis for much of the electricity
framework and physical and financial investments that remain in
54
place today.
After enactment of the FPA, PURPA was the next major
federal energy legislation. In PURPA, "Congress committed itself to a
program designed to subsidize the growth of non-fossil fuel sources of
electric power by requiring utilities to buy back the surplus power
from alternative generators." 55 This was meant to "reduce dependence
on foreign oil, to promote alternative energy sources and energy
efficiency, and to diversify the electric power industry."56 PURPA
allowed independent electric generators to own and operate
generation facilities for the first time. Congress required utilities to
buy electricity from these independent generators at the same rate
that it would cost the utilities to produce the power, known as the
utility's "avoided cost."57 More recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005
("EPAct 2005") altered PURPA by "requiring utilities to provide net
metering services and other smart metering practices that would
allow for more distributed uses of the transmission system," added a
"requirement that a utility must provide interconnection services to
any customer in that utility's service area," and "repealed the
obligation in PURPA that utilities purchase electricity from certain
'
qualifying facilities. "58
is now FERC over transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, and sale of electricity at
wholesale in interstate commerce).
52. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 1017, 1033 (discussing the historical obstacles to federal
authority for transmission line siting).
53. Fucci, supranote 49, at 348.
54. Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 535.
55. Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1425, 1427 (2010).
56. Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 535.
57. Fucci, supra note 49, at 349.
58. Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 536.
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Prior to 1992, any utility that wanted to move electricity across
another system had to first obtain approval. 59 In 1992, Congress
sought to promote even greater competition at the generator level.
Because competition in generation is only possible if nonutility
generators have access to the same transmission lines that utilities
own, Congress authorized FERC to require that utilities allow open
and nondiscriminatory access to the transmission grid as part of the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 ("EPAct 1992").60 FERC did so by
promulgating Order 888 in 1996, which requires all transmission
utilities that also generate electricity to "file open access nondiscriminatory transmission tariffs ("OATTs") that contain minimum
service. ' 6 1
non-discriminatory
of
conditions
and
terms
Nondiscriminatory service includes a requirement that all electricity
generators connect to the grid for the same price. 62 The EPAct 1992
also incentivized renewable energy generation by introducing the
Production Tax Credit ("PTC").63 The PTC, by providing a credit of
$0.02 for each kWh produced, has helped increase installed wind
64
capacity from only 2,000 MW in 1993 to over 25,000 MW today.
Unfortunately, the PTC, which is not permanent and has repeatedly
been allowed to expire, has created a "boom-and-bust" cycle of
investment. Projects are rapidly completed before the PTC expiration,
unnecessarily driving up prices, followed by a collapse in investment
in wind energy infrastructure of 73% to 93% in the years after the
65
expiration.
The next major piece of legislation in this area was the EPAct
2005, which Congress enacted "to promote energy efficiency and a
diversity of fuel sources, as well as strengthen the interstate delivery

59. Id. at 535.
60. Id. at 542.
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id.
63. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). The Production Tax Credit currently pays 2.20 per kilowatt-hour
for generated wind energy and is set to expire in December 2012. Renewable Electricity
Production Tax Credit, DSIRE: DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY,

http://dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?IncentiveCode=US13F (last updated May 22, 2012).
64. Jeffry S. Hinman, The Green Economic Recovery: Wind Energy Tax Policy After
FinancialCrisis and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, 24 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 35, 60 (2009).
65. Christopher Riti, Comment, Three Sheets to the Wind: The Renewable Energy
Production Tax Credit, CongressionalPolitical Posturing,and an Unsustainable Energy Policy,
27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 783, 789, 795 (2010); see also Hinman, supra note 64, at 61 (analyzing
the PTC's effectiveness by comparing the amount of new capacity during years it was
continuously in effect with years in which it expired).
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system for energy supplies."66 The legislation was a direct reaction to
the 2003 blackouts in the Northeast and the Midwest, 67 and "Congress
sought to strengthen the reliability of the national transmission grid
and promote greater regulatory certainty, with the hope that billions
of dollars in new transmission investments would occur." 68 The EPAct
2005 amended the FPA, and as part of those amendments added
section 216, which created a number of policies that affected
transmission line siting. These include the establishment of national
interest electric transmission corridors ("NIETCs"), federal "backstop"
siting authority, and a framework for interstate compacts. Although
many hoped this additional federal authority would have a significant
impact on overcoming roadblocks to transmission siting, the actual
impact has been extremely limited to date.
NIETCs: The EPAct 2005 directs the U.S. Department of
Energy ("DOE") to conduct a transmission congestion study every
three years to identify any areas of the country that are experiencing
transmission constraints or congestion. 69 If such areas exist, the DOE
may classify them as NIETCsY ° NIETC designation allows FERC to
exercise "backstop" siting authority under section 216 of the FPA and
override state barriers to transmission siting.7 1 In designating
NIETCs, the DOE must consult with affected states. 72 Although the
DOE attempted to designate NIETCs for the first time in 2007 in the
Southwest (California and Arizona) and the Mid-Atlantic (New York
to Washington, D.C.), 73 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
vacated those designations in early 2011 for failure to adequately
consult the affected states and for failure to adequately consider
environmental impacts as required by NEPA. 74 As a result, the
NIETC corridor designations were remanded to the DOE to begin the

66.

Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 43, at 422.

67. Id. at 423.
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1221, 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006) (mandating such studies
of congested areas).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a) (2006).
71. Ninth Circuit Vacates the Department of Energy Congestion Study and Designation of
National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors,CORP. COUNS. MONITOR, Apr. 2011, at 19.
72. Id.
73. See National Electric TransmissionCorridor Report and the OrderedNational Corridor
Designation, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://nietc.anl.gov/nationalcorridor/index.cfm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2012) (listing the states comprising the Mid-Atlantic and Southwest Area National

Corridors).
74. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011).
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process over again.7 5 Notably, although many states opposed the
NIETCs, some states favored them in order to allow easier export of
renewable resources to population centers. For instance, in her
comments to the DOE in 2008, Susan Wefald, then a North Dakota
Public Service Commissioner, expressed concerns over the
impediments to interstate transmission line siting, and hoped that the
Dakotas would be designated as a NIETC, which would allow for more
efficient transmission line siting in connection with developing the
76
state's wind resources.
In September 2011, the Obama Administration formulated a
plan that would delegate the DOE's authority to designate NIETCs to
FERC. 77 This delegation was specifically designed to overcome the
Ninth Circuit's ruling discussed above and the Fourth Circuit's ruling
discussed below.7 8 The proposed delegation would have allowed FERC
to conduct reviews of transmission projects at the same time as state
authorities, whereas now FERC must wait until state authorities have
concluded all reviews before it can begin its process. 7 9 Some members
of Congress immediately opposed this plan, however, on grounds it
would rewrite the EPAct 2005 by allowing FERC to approve specific
projects by designating congestion corridors.8 0 After additional
widespread criticism from state public utility commissioners and some
utilities, the Administration withdrew the proposed plan less than a
8
month after its original proposal. '
Backstop Siting Authority: As noted above, the EPAct 2005
granted FERC siting and eminent domain authority over interstate
75. Id.
76. See Susan Wefald, N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'r, Comments at U.S. Department of Energy
3
(June 18,
2008),
available at
Congestion
Study
Workshop
Transmission
http://congestion09.anl.gov/documents/docs/WefaldNorth Dakota_PSC.pdf ("It is still our hope
that the Department will recognize the critical contribution the Dakotas can make towards
resolving our national energy crisis with an NIETC designation in 2009. This designation would
assure investors that needed transmission investment across state boundaries is a priority, not
only to the region, but to the nation as well.").
77. See Peter Behr, Industry Hears of Details of New FERC Energy Strategy, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2O11/09/07/O7climatewire-industry-hears-details(reporting on plan to create fast-track
of-new-ferc-energy-st-69363.html?pagewanted=all
approval process for major transmission lines serving renewable energy projects).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Hannah Northey, Transmission:Bingaman Moves to Block DOE, FERC Grid Proposal,
ENV'T

&

ENERGY

DAILY,

Sept.

13,

2011,

available at

http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily

/2011/09/13/6.
81. See Lynn Garner, Energy Department Drops Plan to Cede Power to FERC for Siting
Transmission Lines, 42 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2297 (Oct. 14, 2011) (reporting the DOE's
abandonment of the plan).
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transmission lines under certain conditions when a transmission
developer is not able to site a line at the state level. Specifically, in
order to exercise such backstop authority, FERC must establish that
(1) the state does not have the authority to approve the siting of the
line or to consider the benefits of the interstate line in its approval
process, 8 2 (2) the state is unable to site the line because the
transmission applicant does not (and will not) sell retail electricity in
the state,8 3 (3) the state is able to site the line but has not done so
after one year, or (4) the state has sited the line in a manner that will
not "significantly reduce transmission congestion in interstate
commerce or is not economically feasible."8 4 Pursuant to section 216,
FERC issued a final rule to implement its backstop siting authority
which provided that state denial of a siting permit could constitute the
"withholding of approval," allowing FERC to override the state
decision. States, environmental groups, and industry groups
challenged the rule in court, and in a 2010 decision the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit invalidated the rule as beyond FERC's
authority.8 5 The court found that if a state denies a siting permit,
FERC cannot overrule that decision under section 216 because the law
only provides backstop authority where a state refuses to act within
one year, or where the state grants a permit but attaches "projectkilling conditions" which constitute a misuse of state authority, not
when a state merely denies a siting permit.8 6 As a result of this
decision, FERC's backstop siting authority remains limited at best.
Interstate Compacts:8 7 Section 1221 of the EPAct 2005
authorizes three or more contiguous states to enter into an interstate
compact that establishes regional siting agencies to carry out those
states' siting responsibilities. 8 8 To promote interstate compacts and
regional coordination, the EPAct 2005 prohibits FERC from using its

82.

16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(A) (2006).

83.

§ 824p(b)(1)(B).

84.

§ 824p(b)(1)(C).

85. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1138 (2010).
86. Id. at 314-15.
87. See § 824p(b) (discussing construction permits for transmission facilities); Mike Dotten
& Steve Jones, Battle over Transmission Siting: Congress Considers FederalizingPermit Process,
While Fourth Circuit Upholds States' Right to Control It, MARTEN LAW (Mar. 10, 2009),
(discussing
the
http:llwww.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20090310-transmission-siting-battle
balance between federal and state authority for transmission siting).
88. DIANE B. DAVIES ET AL., ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION SITING PROCESSES IN SELECTED
WESTERN AND MIDWESTERN STATES 40 (2010), available at http://www.three-county.org

/6004492_l.pdf.
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backstop authority to permit a line within a state that is a party to a
compact, unless there is disagreement among the various party
states. 8 9 At this time, no "interstate compacts for transmission
siting.., have been officially formed." 90
In the wake of FERC's unsuccessful efforts to implement the
EPAct 2005, some members of Congress have attempted to create a
larger federal role in this area, but so far without success. 91 Most
notably, in 2009, the House of Representatives adopted the American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (also known as the WaxmanMarkey Bill). 92 While the Waxman-Markey Bill was adopted by the
House, it was never taken up by the Senate and has completely lost
any momentum in Congress at present.93 The Waxman-Markey Bill
was most well-known for creating a federal cap-and-trade system to
limit greenhouse gas emissions, but it also included a major provision
relating to renewable energy and electricity transmission. 94 It
endorsed a regional transmission-planning process that expanded
federal backstop authority over transmission, and established FERC
review of plans for consistency with transmission principles, including
the deployment of renewable and low-carbon energy sources. 95 The bill
would have expanded FERC authority in western states by allowing it
to preempt state action if a state failed to approve the construction
and routing of a transmission line within a year after application,
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Securing America's Future with Energy and Sustainable Technologies Act, S.
559, 112th Cong. § 601 (2011) (attempting to establish a national renewable electricity standard
of 25% by 2025); Renewable Electricity Promotion Act of 2010, S. 3813, 111th Cong. §
610(b)(1)(B) (2010) (attempting to establish a national renewable portfolio standard of 15% by
2021); Powering America for Tomorrow Act, H.R. 5515, 111th Cong. (2010) (attempting to
mandate designation of regional transmission authorities); American Clean Energy Leadership
Act, S. 1462, 111th Cong. §§ 121, 132 (2009) (responding directly to the holding in Piedmont, this
bill would have granted federal backstop siting authority in all fifty states and would have
developed a national renewable portfolio standard); American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 101(a), 151(b) (2009) (also responding directly to the holding in
Piedmont, the bill would have encouraged regional entities for transmission planning, would
have expanded FERC backstop siting authority over all Western states, regardless of NIETC
designations, and would have established a national renewable portfolio standard); Clean
Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act, S. 539, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (attempting to
allow the DOE to designate national renewable energy zones and expanding FERC's backstop
siting authority to these zones).
92. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
93. See H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, GoVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hlll-2454 (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (noting that
the bill passed the House of Representatives but not the Senate).
94. H.R. 2454 § 101.
95. Id. § 151.
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rejected the application, or imposed unreasonable conditions on the
project.9 6 The bill was a direct response to the Fourth Circuit's holding
in Piedmont.97 Moreover, the bill would have established a federal
RPS, requiring that 6% of electric power come from renewable
resources by 2012, and 20% by 2020. The Waxman-Markey Bill would
not have preempted state-level RPSs, but instead would have given
regulated utilities federal credits in an amount equal to the state
98
credits that they were already earning.
2. FERC Orders Governing Transmission Line Siting
In general, FERC exercises authority over electricity
transmission pursuant to section 201 of the FPA, 99 while sections 205,
206, and 212 grant FERC the authority to set rates. Section 205
covers rate filing by public utilities engaged in the wholesale market,
and section 206 contains provisions for rate changes initiated by
FERC. In both cases the standard for compliance is the "just and
reasonable rate" standard. Both sections prohibit terms of service that
are unduly discriminatory or preferential. Section 212 allows
transmission utilities to recover their costs through rates with the
same nondiscrimination conditions. 100 Pursuant to its authority,
FERC has issued various orders relevant to transmission systems,
some of which highlight the challenges associated with building
enhanced transmission for renewable energy development.
Order 888: In 1996, FERC issued Order 888, which adopted a
nationwide policy of "open access" to the transmission system. 10 ' This
required every transmission line owner subject to FERC jurisdiction to
transmit wholesale power at rates, terms, and conditions identical to
those applied to its own wholesale power supplies. 10 2 Order 888
requires all public utilities that own, control, or operate facilities used
for transmitting electric energy in interstate commerce to file

96. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 88, at 42.
97. Peidmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1138 (2010).
98. Dustin Till, Renewable Energy Standards- Californiaand Congress Moving in Different
Directions, MARTEN LAW (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110317-califrenewable-energy-standards.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006); Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 536.
100. Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 536.
101. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 (Mar. 14, 1997) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
102. Norris & Dennis, supranote 44, at 5.
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nondiscriminatory open access transmission tariffs ("OATTs"), which
contain minimum terms and conditions of service. 10 3 This rule was
considered "unprecedented" at the time, since electricity transmission
had long been within the sole purview of the states and now was
subject to federal requirements to promote competition. 104
Order 2000: In 1999, FERC approved Order 2000, which
encourages the creation of RTOs.105 FERC's goal was to promote
efficiency in wholesale electricity markets and to ensure that
electricity consumers pay the lowest price possible for reliable
service.1 0 6 There are six RTOs under FERC jurisdiction: the New York
ISO and the California ISO are single-state RTOs; PJM, which is in
the Mid-Atlantic, the Midwest ISO, which is in the upper Midwest, the
Southwest Power Pool, which serves the lower Great Plains and part
of the South, and the ISO New England, are regional RTOs.10 7 No
RTOs serve the Northwest, the Southeast, the Mountain West, or the
Southwest. I S ERCOT functions as Texas's ISO, but it is not under
FERC's jurisdiction because it is "only asynchronously... connected
to the interstate grid," and therefore does not involve transmission in
interstate commerce. 09 RTOs are discussed in more detail in Part
II.C.
Order 2003: In 2003, FERC issued Order 2003 which requires
transmission line providers to include a large generator
interconnection
procedure ("LGIP") and a large generator
interconnection agreement ("LGIA") in their respective OATTs.1 ° The
order, which was designed to promote fair, competitive, and reliable
operation of the wholesale power market, contains a standard LGIP
and LGIA for large generating facilities (greater than 20 MW in

103. Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 536-37.
104. Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 43, at 419-20.
105. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 2000) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35).
106. Id.
107. Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 540.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 104 FERC
61,103 (July 24, 2003). See MIKE MICHAUD, MATRIX ENERGY SOLUTIONS, A WHITE PAPER ON
UNTANGLING FERC & STATE JURISDICTION INTERCONNECTION ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
DISPERSED
GENERATION
5
(2007),
available
at
http://www.c-bed.org/pdf
/JurisdictionWhitePaper_2007-11-16.pdf (discussing Order 2003); Dworkin et al., supra note
16, at 542 (discussing Order 2003); NAT'L WIND COORDINATING COMM., RTO UPDATE, Sept. 5,
2003, at 1, available at http://www.nationalwind.org/assets/archive/TM-_Update_2003-09.pdf
(discussing Order 2003).
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generating capacity).1 11 Later FERC orders include procedures and
1 12
agreements for small generators as well as for wind projects.
Order 890: The next FERC order that focused extensively on
transmission issues was Order 890 in 2007, which requires public
utilities to participate in open and transparent transmission-planning
processes. 113 The intent of the order was to mitigate conflict at the
local and regional level by facilitating an open process and
coordination.'1 4 In general, FERC does not have authority to allow
transmission line developers to require utilities to pay for
transmission lines from which they derive no benefit. Because
determining benefit can be elusive, this makes it difficult to spread
the cost of new lines among all utilities servicing the region in which
the line will be located. There has also been tension and uncertainty
when transmission line owners seek to charge users who benefit only
indirectly. For example, participant funding principles adopted in
many areas under FERC Order 890 have sometimes made cost
sharing difficult, even among parties who directly benefit from new
transmission. Many have viewed this uncertain allocation scheme as
"chilling transmission development."'1 5 This caused FERC to propose
Order 1000, which leaves cost allocation up to regional entities, but
grants FERC the authority to step in when those regional entities
cannot agree.

Order 1000: FERC issued Order 1000 in July

2011.116

The

order directs organizations and states to cooperate and to consider the
benefits of interstate transmission lines. It establishes three
requirements for transmission planning. Each public utility
transmission provider must (1) participate in a regional transmission-

111. Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 104 FERC
61,103 (July 24, 2003). See MICHAUD, supra note 110, at 5 (discussing Order 2003); Dworkin et
al., supra note 16, at 542 (discussing Order 2003); NAT'L WIND COORDINATING COMM., supra note
110 (discussing Order 2003).
112. See Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures,
70 Fed. Reg. 34,190 apps. E-F (June 13, 2005) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing
interconnection procedures and agreements for small generators); Interconnection for Wind
Energy, 111 FERC
61,353 (June 2, 2005) (discussing interconnection procedures and
agreements for wind generators); Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 542 (discussing FERC orders
on wind generators and small generators).
113. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed. Reg.
12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 37).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006); DAVIES ETAL., supra note 88, at 42.
115. Steven C. Kohl & Scott M. Watson, A Brief Introduction to Electricity Transmission,
MICH. B.J., Jan. 2011, at 22, 25.
116. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 136 FERC 61,051 (July 21, 2011).
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planning process that satisfies the requirements set out in Order 890
and produce a regional transmission plan, (2) establish procedures to
identify transmission needs based on public policy requirements in
state or federal laws or regulations and evaluate proposed solutions to
those transmission needs, and (3) coordinate with public utility
transmission providers in neighboring transmission-planning regions
to determine if there are more efficient or cost-effective solutions to
mutual transmission needs.1 7 One of the purposes of the order is to
give more priority to lines that will serve renewable energy goals and
make those lines more affordable. Significantly, in Order 1000, FERC
articulated "public policy benefits" as a new type of transmissionrelated benefit. "That is, transmission lines that make it easier to
achieve the goals of a public policy-say, a state renewable energy
standard-have a clear public benefit that should be considered in
18
planning and cost-allocation processes."
The issue of public benefit in Order 1000 is significant because
one of the major disputes in transmission development is who should
bear the costs of new transmission infrastructure. Renewable-project
developers and customers in large urban areas, for example, stand to
benefit from transmission upgrades in the Midwest, but utilities and
states that do not stand to immediately benefit from such upgrades
have opposed efforts to regionalize the costs of these projects in
transmission rates. In a 2009 decision written by Judge Richard
Posner, Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC,1 9 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that FERC was required to
quantify the benefits from allocating the costs of new transmission to
wholesale customers before imposing those costs. The opinion was
subject to a strong dissent by Judge Cudahy, who would have
approved FERC's decision to impose regional cost sharing given the
difficulty of quantifying the reliability benefits of new transmission. 20
The question of how to spread out costs for a new transmission
line is "guided by the 'cost causation' principle, which has long
117. Chad Marriott, FERC Issues Order No. 1000 on Transmission Planning and Cost
Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, RENEWABLE + L. (July 22,
2011), http://www.lawofrenewableenergy.com/211/07/articles/transmission-1/ferc-issues-orderno- 1000-on-transmission-planning-and-cost-allocation-by-transmission-owning-and-operatingpublic-utilities/.
118. Richard W. Caperton, FERC Helps Line Up Clean Energy Projects with New Rule,
CENTER FOR

AM. PROGRESS

(July 28,

2011),

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011

/07/fercorder_1000.html.
119. 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009).
120. Id. at 479 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Rossi, supra
note 55, at 1447 (discussing Judge Cudahy's dissenting opinion).
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influenced how FERC and the courts approach allocating transmission
costs (and recovering those costs from electricity consumers). Under
this principle, rates must 'reflect to some degree the costs actually
caused by the customer who must pay them.' "121 "This principle can
also be thought of as a 'beneficiary pays' approach because, as the
Seventh Circuit recently put it, '[t]o the extent that a [customer]
benefits from the costs of new facilities, it may be said to have
"caused" a part of those costs.' "122 Accordingly, Order 1000 is an effort
by FERC to create additional authority to spread transmission costs
regionally, which will facilitate regional transmission lines to expand
the reliability of the transmission grid generally and increase capacity
for renewable energy specifically.
3. Federal Projects and Federal Lands
In contrast with the difficulty FERC has had asserting federal
authority over transmission line siting on private lands, the federal
government has plenary authority over transmission line siting on
federal lands, which constitute a significant percentage of the land in
western states. Moreover, in the EPAct 2005, Congress required the
U.S. Department of the Interior to approve 10,000 MW of renewable
energy-generating projects on public lands by 2015, providing
123
additional incentives for transmission projects on federal lands.
There are several laws in place that grant the federal government
authority to site transmission lines on federal land. These include the
Federal Lands Policy and Management Act 124 and the National Forest
Policy Management Act,125 which allow the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") and the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
respectively, to include transmission lines in their land use plans and
issue transmission permits. Notably, the BLM program excludes
protected areas, such as Wilderness and Wilderness Study Areas,
National Monuments, and Wild and Scenic Rivers, from wind energy
development. The BLM program requires that wind energy projects
be developed, to the extent possible, in a manner that allows other

121. Norris & Dennis, supra note 44, at 6 (quoting K.N. Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d
1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
122. Norris & Dennis, supra note 44, at 6 (quoting Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 576 F.3d at
476).
123. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 211, 119 Stat. 594, 660.
124. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (2006).
125. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2006).
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land uses, such as mineral development, grazing, and recreational
use.

12 6

As a result of this authority, there are several transmission
projects proposed for federal lands, many of which are designed to
facilitate the growth of renewable energy. These include SunZia and
the Zephyr Project ("ZTP").
SunZia is a line that will transmit primarily renewable energy
(wind and solar). The estimated transmission capacity for this
127
proposed line is 3,000 MW for two 500 kV alternating current ("AC")
lines (or more if a hybrid line is justified). 128 The length of the
proposed route is approximately 500 miles. One preferred route for the
SunZia line maximizes use of public lands managed by the BLM, the
Arizona State Land Department and the New Mexico State Land
Office. Over 80% of this route in Arizona and New Mexico is on public
land.129 Use of private property will be acquired through fee purchase
and easements. 130 In the spring of 2011, FERC approved SunZia's
application to offer capacity at negotiated rates."'3
ZTP will be a 3,000 MW, 950-mile line connecting wind energy
projects in eastern Wyoming to the Southwest, allowing California to
access those renewable resources for purposes of meeting its state
renewable energy standard. 1 2 The line is currently designated to be in
service by 2020 at a cost of approximately $3.5 billion. Duke American

126. Jeremy Firestone & Jeffrey P. Kehne, Wind, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY
AND RENEWABLES 361, 373 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011).
127. Most electric transmission in the United States today is alternating current ("AC")
which allows power to move in both directions. Over very long distances, however, direct current
("DC"), where power moves in only one direction, can be more efficient and result in less power
loss over the length of the line. DC acts more like an extension cord with no "off ramps" meaning
that power cannot be added to the line or used from the line except at each end through special
converters. See MICHAEL HEYECK & EVAN R. WILCOX, AM. ELEC. POWER, INTERSTATE ELECTRIC
TRANSMISSION: ENABLER FOR CLEAN ENERGY 4-5 (2008), available at http://www.aep.com/

about/transmissiondocs/EnablerforCleanEnergy.pdf (explaining history of development of AC
and DC systems and benefits and drawbacks to both); ALEXANDRA VON MEIR, ELECTRIC POWER
SYSTEMS: A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION 49 (2006) (defining and discussing prevalence of AC and
DC
lines);
About
HVDC
Technology,
CLEAN
LINE
ENERGY
PARTNERS,
http://www.cleanlineenergy.com/technology/hvdc (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (discussing the
advantages of DC power lines).
128. SUNZIA, http://www.sunzia.net (last visited Sept. 2, 2012).
129. SunZia Southwest Transmission Project Information, SUNZIA, http://www.sunzia.net/
project-information.php?showtab=description (last visited Sept. 2, 2012).
130. Id.
131. Sunzia Transmission, LLC, 135 FERC 61,169 (May 20, 2011).
132. See Zephyr Project, WYO. INFRASTRUCTURE AUTHORITY http://wyia.org/projects/
transmission-projects/zephyr-project-ztp/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (describing the Zephyr
project).
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Transmission Company is developing the line and FERC granted
negotiated rate authority in 2009. Duke American is currently seeking
a permit from the BLM to place the line in a right-of-way ("ROW")
corridor. The Pathfinder Renewable Wind Energy's wind-generation
project in Wyoming has subscribed 2,100 MW of the line's capacity
and an "open season" will determine subscription for the remaining
133
900 MW of capacity.
These projects on federal lands are closely tied to California's
RPS, which mandates that utilities obtain 33% of their electricity from
renewable energy sources by 2020.134 This standard will require the
state to import more renewable electricity from other states.
Nevertheless, renewable energy generation is often quicker to build
than transmission lines, and the lack of transmission makes it
difficult for the many proposed solar projects in Arizona, Nevada, and
New Mexico to transport renewable energy to California.
B. State Renewable Energy and TransmissionPolicy in the Context of
Federalism Values
As noted earlier, aside from the PTC and the current
Administration's policy for federal lands, it is primarily the states
rather than the federal government that are setting renewable energy
policy throughout the country. Moreover, the bulk of siting and
permitting authority for transmission lines continues to rest with the
states. As a result, at least until Congress takes an active role in
renewable energy policy or partially or fully preempts state authority
with regard to transmission line siting, it is impossible to talk about
renewable energy or interstate transmission without placing a
significant focus on the states. As noted in Part I, state public utility
commissions have authority to consider, evaluate, approve, and site
intrastate and interstate transmission lines. 135 Resting so much
authority with the states for the siting and operation of what is a
regional and national transmission system poses unique federalism
challenges.

133. See DUKE AM. TRANSMISSION CO., ZEPHYR POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT, 1 (2012),

http:/www.datcllc.com/wp.content/uploads/2012/02/ZephyrProject-Web.pdf
available
at
(describing the Zephyr Project).
134. See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text (discussing the California RPS).
135. See Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 538 (noting that states usually vest approval
authority for transmission lines in public utility commissions); Rossi, supra note 17, at 1019-22
(describing state regulators' certificate of need and siting determinations).

1828

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:6:1801

As background, the U.S. Constitution creates a system of "dual
sovereignty" between the federal government and the states, where
the federal government has enumerated and supreme powers that are
limited in scope and the states have residual broad and plenary
powers. 13 6 This federalist system assures "a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous
society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the
137
States in competition for a mobile citizenry."'
1
3
8
Until the New Deal, the idea of dual federalism dominated
judicial discourse surrounding the relationship between the states and
the federal government.1 3 9 The concept was that "the states and the
federal government exercised exclusive control over non-overlapping
regions of authority" and that the courts were charged with defining
and monitoring these exclusive spheres. 140 Since the rise of the federal
regulatory state, however, these lines have become significantly
blurred, with the federal government and the states "engaging in
overlapping regulation of a wide range of subjects including education,
public health and safety, transportation, and environmental
protection.' 41 Scholars have given varying labels to this new brand of
federalism, including "polyphonic federalism," "dynamic federalism,"
"empowering federalism," and "cooperative federalism.' ' 1 42
Notably though, one area in which the idea of separate spheres
of federal/state regulation persists is land use, which has remained
almost exclusively within the realm of state law. This is not to say
136. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (enumerating Congress's powers); U.S. CONST. amend. X
(reserving unenumerated powers to the states); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)
(describing states' reserved powers).
137. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
138. The "New Deal" refers to congressional legislation and executive orders in the 1930s
under the direction of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to respond to the economic
challenges of the Great Depression. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 91-96 (17th ed. 2010) (describing Supreme Court decisions in response to
Roosevelt's New Deal efforts).
139. Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 33, 34
(William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 646-47 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(rejecting a concept of federalism based on "inviolable . . . spheres" that separate state and
federal functions); Schapiro, supra note 139, at 40-41 (stating that "overlapping state and
federal regulation has become the norm for many, if not most" areas of regulation).
142. See Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revisited:
Federalism,Green Building Codes, and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
335, 357 (2010) (discussing modern theories of federalism and citing scholarly articles).
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that Congress does not have the power to preempt or displace state
law in this area. 143 To the contrary, most scholars agree that Congress
has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate land use
44
because of the impact of land use policies on interstate commerce.1
Although Congress has regulated air pollution, water pollution, waste,
coastal areas, and endangered species in ways that necessarily
impinge on state and local land use authority, these interferences are
the exception rather than the rule. 145 It is this history that has in
many ways led to Congress's opposition to preempting state authority
in the area of siting energy facilities (whether they be traditional
power plants, wind farms, or other renewable energy facilities),
despite recent calls from scholars that more federal involvement in
146
what is now clearly an interstate energy system is necessary.
The need for greater federal involvement (or at least regional
siting authorities) seems even more acute, however, in the area of
transmission line siting, which, unlike energy facility siting, is
inherently interstate. The prior Section, however, shows how

143. Federal preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which
states that the Constitution and U.S. laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land"
notwithstanding any state law to the contrary. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal preemption
occurs when: (1) Congress preempts state law by saying so in express terms (express
preemption); (2) Congress and federal agencies create a sufficiently comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme in an area where the federal interest is so dominant that it requires the
inference that Congress left no room for state law (implied field preemption); or (3) Congress
does not completely displace state regulation but the state law actually conflicts with federal law
or stands as an obstacle to achieving Congress's purposes and objectives (conflict preemption).
See Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (citing Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977), Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947), Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (listing the three types of preemption); Caleb
Nelson, Preemption,86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226-28 (2000) (describing three types of preemption).
144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (enumerating Congress's power to regulate commerce);
Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: SustainableDesign, Land Use Regulation, and the
States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 261 (2008) (arguing that the federal government can regulate land
use through its Commerce Clause powers); Jerold S. Kayden, National Land-Use Planning in
America: Something Whose Time Has Never Come, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 445, 451-52 (2000)
(same).
145. See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the
United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 446-47 (2007) (describing overlapping federal
and state land use regulations); Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 241, 255-56 (2011) (noting that federal authority over hydroelectric facilities is an exception
to states' primary authority over land use); Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable
Development: Threads of a National Land Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 384 (2000)
(describing the federal Coastal Zone Management Act).
146. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and
Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1092 (2009)
(advocating a federal-local cooperative framework for wind siting policies analogous to the
Telecommunication Siting Policy in the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996).
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politically difficult it has been for Congress to transfer any siting
authority from the states to the federal government or for FERC to
exercise the authority Congress has given it. Leaving siting authority
for interstate transmission lines exclusively within state (and
sometimes even local) authority causes significant problems because,
for the most part, states consider only in-state benefits in their siting
determinations even though the benefits of the projects are primarily
regional. 147 But Professor Sara Bronin has noted, in the context of
traditional land use regulation, that there are significant political and
practical difficulties associated with creating regional approaches to
land use. These include the need for state funding, defined powers,
creating entirely new political institutions, and convincing state
authorities to relinquish power in an area of traditional state concern
like land use. 148 In recent decades, the United States has moved to a
more dynamic or cooperative federalism approach in many areas that
were formerly within the exclusive realm of the states, such as health,
safety, and environmental protection. 149 By contrast, transmission line
siting continues to sit squarely in the realm of "land use" and thus
remains subject to almost exclusive state control. In many western
states, the high percentage of land owned and managed by federal
governmental agencies adds an additional layer of complexity.
The fact that transmission line siting in modern times is
interstate in nature but is still subject to virtually exclusive state
authority raises particular federalism concerns. As Justice Brandeis
stated in 1932, one of the core values of our federalist system is that it
encourages innovation because "a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."'150 This
model of states as "laboratories of democracy" has led to innovative
state policy over the decades in social security (Wisconsin), health care
reform (Massachusetts), environmental protection (California),
immigration (Arizona), and other policy areas, many of which were

147. See, e.g., Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu:
Evolving Notions of the "PublicInterest" in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U.
COLO. L. REV. 705, 724-26 (2010) (describing how local consequences often outweigh the regional
benefits of new transmission lines in the siting process); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental
Regulation, Energy, and Market Entry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F., 167, 178-80 (2005)
(considering problems of state focus on instate benefits of interstate lines where real benefits are
regional in nature).
148. Bronin, supra note 144, at 264-66.
149. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
150. New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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ultimately adopted by the federal government. 151 Notably though, in
each of these areas, states could work independently to set policy for
their citizens without the need to work cooperatively with other states
or the federal government. With their own taxing power and
regulatory authority, states can, for the most part, create significant
environmental protection programs, health care programs, education
programs, and other policies even if other states choose not to do
likewise. Thus, each state can serve as its own laboratory.
The same model does not hold true for interstate transmission
lines. With perhaps the exception of Texas, as described below, most
states are dependent on other states for energy imports or exports and
cannot construct transmission lines for such interstate imports and
exports without working with other states. Thus, Justice Brandeis's
vision of states as individual laboratories does not apply easily to
innovations in transmission line siting and development.' 52 The
question, then, is how to evaluate innovations states are taking within
the federalist system and build on them. This Section thus considers
what states are doing not just in terms of their individual renewable
energy and transmission line policy innovations, but with a focus on
how they are cooperating with other states to increase renewable
energy and develop transmission within a region. The sections that
follow consider groups of states in the Midwest and West, as well as
Texas, which is arguably the only state that can realistically engage in
its own "laboratory" without working with other states, at least for the
present time. The discussion of the challenges these states face and
how they attempt to address them sets the stage for Part III, which
considers potential solutions. These include greater levels of federal
preemption of state law, the possibility of increased authority for
regional entities, and the potential value of allocating the costs of new
lines on a wider regional basis.

151. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
1097, 1109 (2009) (discussing California's innovations with air pollution regulation); Kirsten H.
Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 54, 63-64 (2005) ("History is rife with examples of federal legislation that has drawn
heavily from ideas being developed at the state level, social security being a prominent
example."); Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and
Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229, 231 (2007) (discussing Massachusetts's innovative
health care law).
152. New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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1. The Midwest: Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa
Several states in the Midwest are leaders in developing both
wind energy and regional transmission to integrate wind energy into
the transmission system. While those states must work within the
parameters of the Midwest ISO with regard to access to transmission
lines, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa in particular have
experienced rapid development of renewable energy projects. Utilities
in those states have worked together to obtain multistate approval for
siting transmission lines to facilitate these projects.
As of June 2012, Minnesota had installed 2,718 MW of wind
power, 153 resulting in the state generating an estimated 14.9% of its
electricity from wind for 2011, and placing it in the top five states for
both MW of wind installed and percent of total electricity generated
from wind. 154 With no coal, natural gas, or oil reserves, Minnesota is
an electricity importer, and developing indigenous wind resources has
enjoyed broad political support. 155 In 2007, Minnesota enacted its
renewable energy standard ("RES"),156 which requires utilities to
generate at least 25% of their electricity provided to customers from
renewable energy by 2025.157 The RES also allows Minnesota utilities
to meet their statutory obligations by purchasing RECs from outside
of the state. Because Minnesota's largest area of potential wind
development is the Buffalo Ridge in the southwest corner of the state
and the neighboring states of North Dakota and South Dakota,
fulfilling the RES will include siting additional transmission lines to
158
bring wind energy from those states to Minnesota.

153. RYAN WISER & MARK BOLINGER, LAWRENCE

BERKELEY NATL

LAB.,

2011 WIND

TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 9 tbl.2 (2012), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports
Jlbnl-5559e.pdf; AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, AWEA U.S. WIND INDUSTRY SECOND QUARTER 2012
MARKET REPORT
7 (2012), available at http://www.awea.org/learnabout/publications/
reports/upload/2Q2012_MarketReportPublicVersion.pdf.
154. WISER & BOLINGER, supra note 153, at 9 tbl.2; AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, supra note 153,
at 7.
155. Elizabeth J. Wilson & Jennie C. Stephens, Wind Deployment in the United States:
States, Resources, Policy, and Discourse, 43 ENVT'L SCI. & TECH. 9063, 9065, 9069 (2009).
156. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 2a. (2011).
157. Id. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 2a(a). For Xcel, the largest utility in Minnesota and the only
one that owns a nuclear power plant, the requirement is set at 30%. Id. § 216B.1691, subdiv.
2a(b).
158. See Daniel Cusick, Project that Could Boost Midwest 'Wind Belt' Faces Enviro
Opposition, E&E PUBL'G (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2008/12/01/4
(describing the tri-state transmission line as an "integral part of the utilities' plan" to achieve the
RES). But see JOHN BAILEY ET AL., MEETING MINNESOTA'S RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD USING
THE EXISTING TRANSMISSION SYSTEM 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.c-bed.org/pdf/
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North Dakota, the "Saudi Arabia of Wind" '159 had 1,445 MW of

wind energy online in June 2012, with an estimated penetration of
14.1% of the electricity generated in the state. 160 As of 2010, North
Dakota was ranked second in the nation in terms of percentage of
electricity derived from wind and tenth for installed wind capacity. 161
North Dakota is an electricity exporter, with plentiful coal and
recently developed oil resources as well as plentiful wind resources.
Because of its small population and limited demand for electricity
within the state, transmission lines are a key component of developing
North Dakota's wind resources. It has a voluntary RPS of 10%
renewables by 2015162 and a corporate renewable energy tax credit
that provides a refund of up to 15% of the cost of installing a
renewable energy system through 2014.163 Also, commercial wind

energy operations of 100 MW or greater built before 2015 will be taxed
164
at 3% (rather than 10%) of assessed value.
Wind development in Iowa has also been rapid and steady. As
of June 2012, Iowa had 4,419 MW of wind energy online, placing it
second in the nation in installed wind capacity behind Texas. 165 Iowa
also ranks second in the nation for percentage of state power derived
from wind, at 18.8%.166 Iowa was the first state to enact a renewable

energy purchase requirement in 1983, and in a survey conducted in
2011, 85% of state residents had "a favorable impression of wind
energy and wind power companies."'167 Although Iowa does not have
an RPS, wind generators sell wind power locally and sell RECs to

meetingminnesotares.pdf (arguing that Minnesota's RPSs can be met without large transmission
upgrades).
159. Joey Peters, "Saudi Arabia of Wind" Has Trouble FiguringOut How to Get the Power
Out, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/04/O6/06climatewire-saudiarabia-of-wind-has-trouble-figuring-ou-17108.html.
160. WISER & BOLINGER, supra note 153, at 9 tbl.2; AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, supra note 153,
at 7.
161. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, supra note 153, at 7; AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, WIND ENERGY
FACTS: NORTH DAKOTA 1 (2012), available at http://awea.org/learnabout/publications/upload/4Q-

1 -North-Dakota.pdf.
162. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-28 (2011).
163. Id. § 57-38-01.8.
164. Id. § 57-06-14.1.
165. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, supra note 153, at 7.

166. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, WIND ENERGY FACTS: IOWA 1 (2012), available at
http://www.awea.org/learnabout/publications/factsheets/upload4Q-11-Iowa.pdf.
167. Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass'n, New Poll: In Iowa, the State that Knows Wind
Energy the Best, Voters Overwhelmingly Support It and the Companies that Make It (July 1,
2011), availableat http://www.awea.org/newsroom/pressreleaseslIowa-Poll.cfm.

1834

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:6:1801

utilities in other states, 168 and Iowa offers a very generous wind169
production tax credit.
Renewable energy development in these three states has been
significant and appears to be a function of individual state policies to
encourage renewable energy development by either setting state
mandates (Minnesota), providing generous tax credits (Iowa and
North Dakota), or encouraging development of wind for export (Iowa
and North Dakota). In order to realize such growth, the states have
had to work together on transmission issues. The largest
transmission-siting project underway in Minnesota is the CapX2020
project, in which eleven Minnesota utilities jointly proposed to
upgrade the state electrical grid. 170 Through a "vision plan" where the
utilities sought to determine necessary transmission upgrades to meet
the demand growth of utilities serving Minnesota customers, the
CapX2020 lines were identified as the most critical group of lines to
address the issues of grid reliability, demand growth, and renewable
energy support. 171 CapX2020 primarily consists of three 345 kV lines
spanning nearly 600 miles from Monticello, MN, to Fargo, ND; from
Hampton, MN, to Brookings County, SD; and from Hampton, MN, to
La Crosse, WI.172
Many environmental groups, which frequently oppose
transmission lines for environmental reasons, have supported
CapX2020 as a way to build the infrastructure necessary to develop
renewable energy.1 73 After obtaining the certificate of need and route
permits in Minnesota, the CapX2020 project will have obtained the
necessary approvals to begin construction. MISO, the RTO for the
Midwest, must approve transmission pricing, however, and the
CapX2020 line from Hampton to Brookings County has been approved

168. Brent Stahl et al., Wind Energy Laws and Incentives: A Survey of Selected State Rules,
49 WASHBURN L.J. 99, 108 (2009).
169. IOWA CODE § 476B.2 (2011); Stahl et al., supra note 168, at 107.
170. CapX2020 Frequently Asked Questions, CAPX2020, http://www.capx2020.com/faq.html
(last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
171. CAPX2020,

APPLICATION

TO THE MINNESOTA

PUBLIC UTILITIES

COMMISSION

FOR

CERTIFICATES OF NEED, § 1.4 (2007), available at http://www.capx2020.com/Regulatory
/StatefMinnesota/CONCapX2020_-3_projects.html.
172. Id.
173. See Wind Power Scores a Victory in Power Line Decisions, HOMETOWNSOURCE.COM

(Apr. 17, 2009), http://hometownsource.com/2009/04/17/wind-power-scores-a-victory-in-powerline-decisions/ (describing the support of clean energy advocates for the CapX2020 project).
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as a Multi Value Project ("MVP"), which will allow costs to be spread
174
and shared across the MISO region's utilities.
As for Iowa, because of the significant amount of wind power
online in the state, there is significant interest by out-of-state
companies in developing greater transmission capability to bring wind
from Iowa to larger population centers. One proposal involves
Houston, Texas-based Clean Line Energy Partners, which has taken
steps to construct a 500-mile DC "merchant" transmission project
across Iowa, transferring wind energy from the state to the Chicago
area and beyond. The $2 billion proposed project, known as the "Rock
Island Line" for its rough approximation to the former Rock Island
Railroad, was designed to encourage additional wind projects in
northwestern Iowa, northeastern Nebraska, and southeastern South
Dakota. 175 Notably, in this proposal, Clean Line Energy Partners is
targeting Illinois and the eastern-running PJM (Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Maryland) transmission network rather than MISO.1 76
Because of the high cost of DC/AC-converter substations, the 600 kV
Rock Island Line would not have any "off-ramps" in Iowa but instead
would be an interstate power highway with no interchanges, shipping
energy across and out of the state. It remains to be seen if such a
proposal would be viable.
In addition, M\lidAmerican Energy is looking to build a project
similar to the Rock Island Line. MidAmerican has partnered with
Columbus, Ohio-based American Electric Power in an effort to
construct a transmission line from Iowa to at least Ohio, beginning
with the eastern connection from Ohio, stretching west into Illinois.177
The project proposers favor the 2011 FERC order (Order 1000)
because it "gives the various authorities a rationale to assign portions
of the costs of such a line to all the recipients of the electricity, not just
the builders who would start the lines somewhere in the Dakotas,

174. Michael Bates, MISO Stamps MVP Status on CapX2020 Brookings Line, N. AM.
WINDPOWER (June 23, 2011),
http://nawindpower.com/elO7_plugins/content/content.php
?content.8130.
175. Dave Dreeszen, Wind Transmission Plans Blow into Iowa, SIOUX CITY J. (Dec. 19,
2010),
http://www.siouxcityjournal.comfbusiness/local/article_90b6806c-f6b4-5ad3-9fb0e583567ae519.html.
176. See Dan Piller, Proposal Calls for Big Power Transmission Line Across Iowa, DES
MOINES

REG.,

June

15,

2011,

at

B8,

available

at

http://www.wind-watch.org

/news/20 11/061 5/proposal-calls-for-big-power-transmission-line-across-iowa/
(de scribing
the
specifications of the Clean Line Energy Partners' proposed transmission line).
177. Dan Piller, Federal Ruling Boosts Wind Energy Interests, DES MOINES REG., Aug. 4,
2011, at B8, available at http://www.wind-watch.org/news/2011/08/04/federal-ruling-boosts-windenergy-interests/.
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Minnesota or Iowa."' 7 8 However, for that same reason the Coalition for
Fair Transmission Policy, a group of Eastern utilities and state
regulators, has stated that "socializing the costs of transmission lines
to access remote renewable resources amounts to an expensive
subsidy for some renewable energy developers that distorts the
marketplace, and ultimately results in higher electricity prices for
everyone." 179 Thus, this project shows the potential impact of FERC
Order 1000 on transmission buildout. It also illustrates how those
states with renewable energy resources in the Midwest and the West
perceive economic benefits in both the short term and the long term
from a wider spreading of costs, while those states without such
resources further east are skeptical, if not outright hostile, to that
goal.
State policies and progress in the Midwest illustrate that states
within a region can work together to develop wind resources in one
state and use them in state or, in the case of North Dakota, export the
power to other states. Utilities in those states as well as developers in
other states have collaborated and invested to create the groundwork
for new, interstate transmission lines, and to distribute that power
both within the Midwest and to eastern states which, for the most
part, have had much more difficulty siting new transmission lines. In
doing so, the states and the utilities within those states are creating
the groundwork for new regional networks to form. If states reach a
comfort level with such regional cooperation, perhaps a transfer of
some authority to a defined regional entity with regard to planning,
siting, or both-as described in Part 111-is politically feasible.
2. The West: California and Oregon
The situation in the West is perhaps more challenging than the
Midwest. Although areas of the West Coast have significant wind
resources, the West has a much larger population to serve, and
California's new renewable energy mandates likely can only be
fulfilled through significant wind development and transmission
buildout both within and outside of California. Indeed, California is an
electricity importer, and its demand affects much of the transmission

178. Id.; see also MIDWEST ISO, MVPS CREATE JOBS, BENEFITS FOR STATES 1, 2, available at
https://www.midwestiso.org[Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/Power%2UpMVp
%20Benefits%20-%2OTotal%2OFootprint.pdf (showing that two of the newly-appointed MultiValue Projects (MVPs) in the MISO region, discussed in Part II.C, infra, are in Iowa).
179. Piller, supra note 177.
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planning in the West. 8 0 As of August 2012, California had 4,425 MW
of wind energy capacity online, ranking it third in the nation for total
installed MW of wind energy. 18' However, due to its large electricity
demand, in 2011 only 4.0% of California's electricity demand was
generated by wind power, ranking it sixteenth among the states in
percentage of state energy derived from wind. 8 2 Amended in 2011,
California has one of the most aggressive RPSs in the nation. 8 3 With
a deadline of January 1, 2012, to set utility-specific targets, the
standard requires 33% of electricity sold in California to be generated
by renewable energy resources by 2020.184 To help reach this
standard, California has implemented additional incentives to
promote renewable energy, such as feed-in tariffs that set
procurement rates for renewable energy at prices comparable to that
of natural gas. 8 5 Additionally, California has created a structure of
three "buckets" to meet the statutory obligations of the RPS: (1) RPSqualifying products generated within the state or a California
balancing authority, (2) products that are used to ensure power
quality and provide incremental power, and (3) unbundled RECs
(where the electric power is used separately from the environmental
benefit, for example when wind energy is generated and used in
Oregon, but a California utility purchases the REC).18 6 To comply with
the RPS, Bucket 1 must account for 50% of compliance products
(increasing to 75% by 2017), and the cumulative percentage of Buckets
2 and 3 must be limited to 25%.187 These restrictions could affect the
demand for renewable energy and the need for transmission lines in

180. Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy Through
Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission System
Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711, 719, 767 (2010).

181. AM. WIND ENERGY ASs'N, WIND ENERGY FACTS: CALIFORNIA 1 (2012), availableat http://
www.awea.orglearnabout/publications/factsheets/factsheetsstate.cfm.
182. WISER & BOLINGER, supra note 153, at 20.
183. See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIRE: DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY (Sept. 2012), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps

JRPS-map.pdf.
184. CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(a) (Deering 2012).
185. See Jim Rossi, Clean Energy and the Price Preemption Ceiling 1, 3 (Fla. State Univ.
Coll. of Law Pub. Law Research Paper No. 508, 2011), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1899026 (discussing the feed-in tariff system in California
as one of the many approaches to encourage renewable power investment).
186. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.16(c) (Deering 2012).

187. Id. See generally Decision Implementing Portfolio Content Categories for the Renewable
Portfolio Standard Program, PUB. UTILS. COMM'N OF THE STATE OF CAL. (Dec. 21, 2011),
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word-pdflFINAL-DECISION/156060.pdf (clarifying the final
decisions on implementation).
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the West. California has also created the Renewable Energy
Transmission Initiative ("RETI") to identify transmission projects
required to meet the RPS goals and to bring together transmission
stakeholders to create a comprehensive transmission plan for
188
California.
Southern California Edison is planning the biggest
transmission project in California's history: the Tehachapi Renewable
Transmission Project. It will transport wind energy from the
Tehachapi area of Kern County to Southern California Edison's power
grid, which serves 14 million people. The $3.5 billion line would be
capable of carrying 4,500 MW. 8 9 The California Public Utility
Commission ("CPUC") approved the first phase of the project in March
2007, and construction of that phase is underway. 190 The next phase
involves 173 miles of transmission lines. 19 1 The project will be very
important for linking renewable energy to California demand centers.
In June 2011, Google announced that it would increase its investment
in the Alta Wind Energy Center ("AWEC") in Tehachapi by providing
another $102 million to finance the 168 MW Alta V Project. This adds
to the $55 million Google has already invested in wind power in the
area.1 92 Also in June 2011, San Diego Gas & Electric announced large
solar contracts, one of which will connect to the grid through the
Tehachapi Renewable Transmission Project. 93 Despite the CPUC's
approval of the project, Chino Hills sued to enforce its ability to grant
right-of-way property rights, and to deny the CPUC's exclusive
jurisdiction in this area. The state trial court held in 2010 that the
CPUC had exclusive jurisdiction, the court of appeals affirmed that
decision in September 2011, and the California Supreme Court denied

188. See BLACK & VEATCH CORP., RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSMISSION INITIATIVE PHASE 1A §

1-1 (2008), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publicationsRET1- 1000-2008-002/RETI1000-2008-002-F.PDF (describing the RETI initiative and its phases of implementation).
189. Ben Baeder, Work Starts on Biggest Electrical Transmission Line Project in Southern
California History, PASADENA

STAR-NEWS

(Sept.

6,

2010),

Segments

4-11,

S.

CAL.

http://www.pasadenastarnews

.com/ci_16008367.
190. Tehachapi

Renewable

EDISON,

http://www.sce.com

/PowerandEnvironment/TransmissionProjectsByCounty/Multi-CountyProjectsTRTP411/tehachapi-4-11.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2012).
191. Id.

192. Rick Needham, Update: Investing Another $102 Million in the Alta Wind Energy Center,
GOOGLE

GREEN

BLOG

(June

22,

2011,

7:30

AM),

http://googlegreenblog.blogspot

.com/201 1/06/update-investing-another- 102-million-in.html.
193. California Utility Signs Contracts for 237MW of Solar, GREEN ECON. (June 23, 2011),
http://uk.ibtimes.com/articles/20110623/california -utility-signs-contracts-237mw- solar. htm.
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review in January 2012.194 During the pendency of the appeals,
however the CPUC stopped construction on the project for purposes of
conducting additional review for the portion of the project through
195
Chino Hills.
As an electricity importer, California will likely also need to
rely on neighboring states to meet its renewable energy needs, though
the current structure of the RPS limits the amount that can be
generated outside of California. 196 While Arizona and Nevada can
provide solar energy in the future if certain major projects come
online, California has historically looked to Oregon for more
immediately available wind energy. Indeed, Oregon has exported
approximately half of its wind power to California since 1998.197 As of
June 2012, Oregon had 2,820 MW of wind power online, ranking it8
seventh in the nation, and deriving 7.1% of its electricity from wind. 19
In 2007, Oregon required its largest electric utilities (PacifiCorp,
Portland General Electric, and the Eugene Water and Electric Board)
to ensure 5% of their retail electricity was renewable by 2011, and the
utilities met this standard. 199 The requirement increases to 15% by
2015, 20% by 2020, and 25% by 2025.200 Smaller utilities will also
have to meet renewable energy standards, but the percentage of
renewable energy is either 5% or 10% based on the size of the
utility.20 1 Companies in Oregon that do not comply with the RPS are
subject to a fine. 20 2 In 2010, Oregon began a pilot program for solar
feed-in tariffs that offered payments by three participating utilities to
194. See Supreme Court Rejects Chino Hills Appeal; Fate Now Rests With PUC, SAN
BERNADINO COUNTY SENTINEL (Jan. 7, 2012), http://sbsentinel.com/2012/01/supreme-courtrejects-chino-hills-appeal-fate-now-rests-with-puc/ (chronicling the opposition of Chino Hills
residents to the Tehachapi line and the fate of their attempts to legally bar construction).
195. Id.
196. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.16 (Deering 2012); See, e.g., Scott Streater, California
Power Demand Drives Expansion of Utah Wind Farm, LAND LETTER, Feb. 3, 2011 (describing
development of 700-MW wind energy facility on federal land in Utah with the power to be sold to
the Southern California Public Power Authority and transmitted to customers in the Los Angeles
area).
197. Cassandra Profita, Why Oregon Imports Power from Fossil Fuels and Exports
Renewable

Energy,

OR.

PUB.

BROADCASTING:

ECOTROPE

(June

1,

2011

3:26

PM),

http://ecotrope.opb.org/201 1/06/why-oregon-imports-power-from-fossil-fuels-and-exportsrenewable-energy/.
198. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, supra note 153, at 1, 7; AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, WIND
www.awea.org/learnabout/
at
available
(2012),
1
OREGON
FACTS:

ENERGY

publications/factsheets/upload2Q-12-Oregon.pdf.
199. OR. REV. STAT. § 469A.052 (2012).

200. Id.
201. Id. § 469A.055.
202. Id. § 469A.200.
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owners of solar energy systems for electricity produced by solar
power. 20 3 Through 2014, the payment rates are between $0.30 and
$0.37/kWh. 20 4 Oregon also has both tax credits for renewable energyequipment manufacturers 205 and "community renewable energy
feasibility funds" 206 to support renewable energy development.
While Oregon's policies have encouraged renewable growth, the
state has not directly addressed the need for new transmission
lines. 20 7 Similar to other states, "Oregon faces a growing schism
between its lack of capacity to move energy from renewable sources,
while current legislation, tax policies, and public demand are creating
208
incentives and pressure to develop these renewable energy sources."
To address these issues, the Governor created the Oregon Energy
Planning Council ("OEPC") in 2008.209 The first OEPC report, in
December 2010, recommended "the state move forward with
developing a comprehensive energy strategy to maintain its leadership
in energy planning, conservation, and new renewable technology."' 2 10
The report made specific recommendations to improve Oregon's
transmission line-siting process, including the creation of a stronger
link between the state PUC and the state Energy Facility Siting
Council to (1) better address the public's concerns regarding the
203. Participating utilities are Portland General Electric, Pacific Power & Light, and Idaho
Power Company. See OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, SOLAR INCENTIVE RATE PILOT PROGRAM (2012),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/puc/solar/SOLARINCENTIVEPILOTPROGRAM81612.pdf
(explaining the upcoming round of the program in October 2012); Solar Feed in TariffFrequently Asked Questions, ENERGY TRUST OF OR. (Oct. 28, 2010), http://energytrust.
org/library/resources/FIT_FAQ.pdf.
204. OR. ENERGY PLANNING COUNCIL, OR. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OREGON ENERGY PLANNING
REPORT
20
(2010),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/RENEW/OEPC/docs/

EnergyPlanFinal.pdf. The third round of the program opened on April 1, 2011 and was quickly
fully subscribed. The next round opened on October 1, 2011. Subsequent re-openings will take
place every six months until the capacity for the program is full. See OR. PUB. UTIL COMM'N,
supra note 203; Oregon: Pilot Solar Volumetric Incentive and Payments Program, DSIRE:
DATABASE

OF ST. INCENTIVES

FOR RENEWABLES

&

EFFICIENCY,

http://www.dsireusa.org/

incentives/incentive.cfm?IncentiveCode=OR134F&re=l&ee=1
(last updated Sept. 21, 2012)
(analyzing Oregon's incentives for renewables and efficiency).
205. OR. REV. STAT. § 315.341 (2011).
206. Renewable Energy Grant: CREFF, OR. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
http://www.
oregon.gov/ENERGY/RENEW/Pages/CREFF.shtml (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
207. See PAUL HOOBYAR, WATERSHED INITIATIVES, LLC, THE RATIONALE FOR ADDRESSING
OREGON'S REGULATORY PROCESS FOR ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION SITING: "How CAN OREGON
IMPROVE ITS TRANSMISSION
SITING PROCESS" 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.

oregon.gov/ENERGY/RENEW/OEPC/docs/RationaleForEPCtoAddressORSitingRegfinal.pdf
(explaining ways to improve Oregon's transmission-siting process).
208. Id. at 2.
209. OR. ENERGY PLANNING COUNCIL, supra note 204, at 5.
210. Id.
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necessity of new transmission lines, (2) create new regulations to
balance the objectives of multiple affected state agencies, (3) develop
clear siting standards to make the application process both more
predictable and better able to realize the public benefits of new
transmission, (4) eliminate the lack of communication and multiple
levels of review by different state agencies, and (5) create a "phased
in their
study approach" that allows applicants to move forward
211
conducted.
being
are
studies
various
while
applications
As noted above, Oregon has exported approximately half of its

wind-generated power to California since

1998.212

As a result, Oregon

imports much of its electricity from other Western states such as coalfired power from Montana and Wyoming. 213 In the meantime,
however, Google and others are in the process of developing the 845
MW Shepherd's Flat Wind Farm in Oregon, which is likely to be the
largest in the world when completed. 214 The $2 billion project has
received $100 million in funding from Google 215 as well as a $1.3
billion loan guarantee from the DOE. 216 The wind farm has received
transmission rights, and is slated to become operational by September
2012;217 100% of the power generated from this farm will be exported
2 18
to California.
The lack of transmission capacity in the Pacific Northwest
region has become acute, and wind farms have been forced to curtail
energy production on a rolling basis. 21 9 This occurred in the Pacific
Northwest in 2011, with 100,000 MWh curtailed after a particularly
wet winter, rapidly warming spring, and low electricity demand for
that time of year. 220 The massive amounts of hydroelectric power
211. Id. at 5-6, 27-31.
212. Profita, supra note 197.
213. Id.

214. Rick Needham, Shepherding The Wind, GOOGLE BLOG (April 18, 2011), http:I
googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/shepherding-wind.html.
215. Wallace Witkowski, Google, Others Invest $500 Mln in GE Wind Farm, MARKET WATCH
(Apr. 18, 2011, 1:21 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/google-others-invest-500-mln-in-gewind-farm-2011-04-18-1320310.
216. Ben Blackwell, DoE Grants $1.3bn Loan Guarantee for Oregon Wind Farm, RECHARGE
(Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.rechargenews.com/energy/windarticle23981 Lece.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. William Pentland, Transmission Bottlenecks Bad News for Renewable Energy, FORBES
BLOG (May 3, 2011, 11:33 PM), http:/fblogs.forbes.com/williampentland/2011/05/03/transmissionbottlenecks-bad-news-for -renewable-energy/.
220. Eileen O'Grady, Bonneville Defends Wind Curtailment in FERC Filing, REUTERS (Jul.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/20/utilites-bonneville-ferc-idUSNlE7
2011),
20,
6J26320110720; Ted Sickinger, The Bonneville Power Administration Punches Back in Wind
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swamped Bonneville Power Association's ("BPA") electric grid, causing
BPA to curtail wind energy. 22 1 BPA insists that it did everything it
could to incorporate wind into the system, but wind developers have
built much faster than the Northwest Wind Integration Action Plan of
2007 predicted. 2 22 Wind farms filed a petition with FERC in the
summer of 2011, asking FERC to force BPA to honor its transmission
contracts and undertake "negative pricing," which would involve
paying utilities outside the region to shut down their own generation
and take all of BPA's excess power. 2 23 BPA contended that such
actions would increase its own customers' rates, which would not be
fair since most power is sold out of state. 224 In December 2011, FERC
ordered BPA to establish new policies to avoid curtailing transmission
access for wind generation during periods of surplus hydropower and
found that BPA's actions constituted a discriminatory practice under
225
the FPA.
These developments in California and Oregon illustrate how
states, even ones as large as California, cannot rely solely on their own
renewable resources or transmission buildout to meet renewable
energy goals. If Oregon is not successful in developing intrastate and
interstate transmission, it will affect Oregon, California, and the
entire Pacific Northwest, as shown by the difficulties of utilizing the
BPA grid. California is certainly acting as a "laboratory of
democracy" 226 with its aggressive RPS, just as it has in many other
areas of environmental protection, including vehicle emissions, smog,
water-resource protection, and chemical regulation. In those areas,
however, California could experiment and make progress on its own.

Versus Water Fight, OREGONLIVE.COM
(July 20, 2011), http://www.oregonlive.com/
business/index.ssf2O11/07/thebonneville-power.administr.html;
Herman
K.
Trabish,
Smackdown: Wind vs. Washington State Grid Operator Over Renewable Integration,
GREENTECHMEDIA

(May 24,

2011),

http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/smackdown-

wind-vs-washington-state-grid-operator-over-renewable -integration/.
221. Trabish, supra note 220. Some blame the problem with curtailment on the need to
protect salmon from elevated levels of dissolved gas in water spilling over the hydro dams;
others, on a failure to properly integrate wind into the BPA system. BPA is an agency of the
DOE, which markets wholesale electricity from thirty-one federal hydroelectric projects in the
West on 15,000 miles of transmission over portions of eight states. Lynn Garner, Bonneville
Power Ordered to Revise Policy to Accommodate Hydropower, Wind Energy, 238 DAILY ENV'T
REP. (BNA) A-12 (Dec. 12, 2011).
222. Trabish, supra note 220.
223. Sickinger, supra note 220.
224. Id.

225. Garner, supra note 221.
226. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (identifying innovative state policies in social
security, health care reform, environmental protection, and immigration).
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In the area of renewable energy, because of its dependence on outside
sources of electricity and a transmission system to bring that power to
the state, it must rely on other states, establish regional
arrangements, seek federal assistance, and create an economic
environment that encourages sufficient investment in transmission for
the entire region.
3. Texas
Unlike the Midwest and West examples above, where states
must both rely on their neighbors for energy imports, exports, and
transmission and answer to the federal government on rate and
discrimination issues, Texas has created an independent nation-state
with regard
to electricity transmission. Texas's electricity
independence began shortly after the passage of the FPA in 1935,
when utilities in Texas chose to remain wholly intrastate so as to not
subject themselves to Federal Power Commission (now FERC)
jurisdiction. 227 During World War II, these intrastate utilities began to
interconnect, forming an intrastate system known as the Texas
228
Interconnected System ('TIS").
In 1970, the TIS and other intrastate utilities banded together
to form the Electric Reliability Council of Texas ("ERCOT"), which was
formed as a "regional electric reliability council" reporting to the
NERC.229 ERCOT manages 85% of Texas's electric grid. 230 FERC has
continued to recognize ERCOT's independence, "so long as electric
energy does not flow over transmission lines between ERCOT and the
rest of the continental United States. 23 1 Thus, even though there are
power lines that connect ERCOT to the rest of the United States,
because power does not regularly flow between ERCOT and the rest of

227. Jared M. Fleisher, ERCOT's JurisdictionalStatus: A Legal History and Contemporary
Appraisal, 3 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 4, 11 (2008).

228. Id.
229. Id. at 11, 12.
230. About ERCOT, ERCOT, http://www.ercot.comlabout/(last visited Sept. 1, 2012); see also
61,198 (Mar. 15, 2007) (finding that transmission
Cottonwood Energy Co., LP, 118 FERC
facilities connected to ERCOT that do not comingle energy with other organizations do not result
in interstate transmission with ERCOT and are not within FERC's interstate pricing
jurisdiction).
231. Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 540; see Cottonwood Energy Co., LP, 118 FERC
61,198 ("The Commission finds that the proposed transmission line, as described in the instant
filing, does not disturb this jurisdictional status quo because electric energy will not flow over
that transmission line between ERCOT and the rest of the continental United States.").
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the country, ERCOT remains independent. 232 This means that Texas
on its own can establish renewable energy policies, decide where wind
farms and other energy-generating industry should be located, site the
lines to bring the wind to population centers, and put the energy
directly in the grid without approval from FERC or a regional RTO or
ISO.
Wind development in Texas has been rapid. As of March 2012,
Texas by far led the nation with 10,684 MW of wind power online. 233
In 2010, wind resources generated 6.4% of Texas's electricity. But
wind curtailment was also a problem, with 8% of wind curtailed in
2010, making transmission a particularly salient issue. 23 4 Texas
promotes wind projects located primarily in the western and
Panhandle regions by allowing counties and other organizations to
offer tax abatements as a developer incentive to build wind projects.

2 35

For example, in July 2011, Young County agreed to a structured tax
abatement with Gamesa Energy, an international wind farm
developer, that would allow the company to build a wind farm and
waive taxes.

236

If the wind farm is later sold to a nontaxable entity,

Gamesa will pay a portion of the abated taxes back to the county. 237
While Texas established a RPS goal of installing 10,000 MW of
renewable capacity by January 1, 2025 (a goal it has already
surpassed), wind projects were driven not only by the RPS but also by
the relative economic value of wind power in Texas at that time
compared to other types of electricity generation. 238

232. See Fleisher, supra note 227, at 12-14, 20 (explaining that ERCOT has minimal
electricity transfers across state lines, but that ERCOT is linked by two asynchronous
connections to Oklahoma).
233. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, AWEA U.S. WIND INDUSTRY FIRST QUARTER 2012 MARKET

REPORT 7 (2012), available at http://www.awea.org/learnabout/publications/reports/upload
/AWEAFirstQuarter_2012_MarketReport_Public.pdf.
234. WISER & BOLINGER, supra note 153, at 9 tbl. 1, vii-viii.
235. Stahl et al., supra note 168, at 137-39. Although a 2008 opinion by the Texas Attorney
General cast doubt on the continued availability of a tax abatement on wind projects, the
legislature amended the statute in 2009 to ensure wind projects were still viable. Id. at 139; see
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 313.008 (West 2008) (identifying wind generation projects as requiring a
Comptroller report).
236. Commissioners Court Minutes, Young County, Texas (July 11, 2011), http://www.co.
young.tx.us/ips/export/sites/young/downloads/COMMISSSIONERSMINUTES_-_07-11-1 1.pdf.
237. Id.
238. See TEX. UTIL.CODE ANN. § 39.904(a) (West 2009) ('The commission shall establish a
target of 10,000 megawatts of installed renewable capacity by January 1, 2025."); Miriam
Fischlein et al., Policy Stakeholders and Deployment of Wind Power in the Sub-national Context:
A comparison of Four U.S. States, 38 ENERGY POL. 4429, 4432, 4437 (2010); see also supra note
233 (identifying that Texas has installed 10,684 MW of wind power)
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When the Texas legislature established its RPS goal in 2005, it
also addressed transmission constraints by creating a process for the
Texas Public Utilities Commission ("TPUC") to plan transmission
facilities in advance of renewable energy-generation facilities. 239 The
resulting five competitive renewable energy zones ("CREZs") that the
TPUC established led to a transmission plan that will allow 18,456
MW of wind energy from the windy western portions of the state to
reach the populous cities in the east. 240 To build out the identified
transmission projects, the TPUC assigned them to various
24 1
transmission service providers ("TSPs") for completion.
There are several private and public transmission projects
underway in Texas. NextEra Energy built the Texas Clean Energy
242
Express privately, outside of the TPUC's CREZ planning process,
and outside the state certificate of convenience and necessity
process. 243 Because it was a private or "merchant" line, NextEra did
not have eminent domain authority, and instead acquired the land "by
paying large, undisclosed sums to landowners." 244 Running from
NextEra's wind farms in Abilene, Texas to a substation in Comfort,
Texas, the 200-mile-plus, 345 kV line allows NextEra to bring its 850
MW of wind from western Texas to the load centers. 245 The line was
built quickly, with the planning and construction processes completed
in less than eighteen months. 246 Because it was private, publicity
regarding construction was relatively quiet, with most of the details of
the line coming to light only after construction was completed. 2 47 In
October 2010, ERCOT's CEO, H.B. Doggett, predicted "several
239. Stahl et al., supra note 168, at 136; see also 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.174 (2009)
(explaining implementation of Competitive Renewable Energy Zones).
240. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N OF Tgx. - CREZ, http://www.texagcrezprojects.coml (last visited
Sept. 2, 2012).
241. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.174(a)(2)(C), (c)(1) (2009).

242. Eileen O'Grady, Update 1 - FPL Power Line May Complicate Texas Wind Growth,
REUTERS

(Oct.

28,

2009),

http:/lin.reuters.com/article/2009/10/27/utilities-wind-

idINN2725847720091027.
243. Lorie Woodward Cantu, Texas High Wires: A Balancing Act for Private Landowners,
TEX. WILDLIFE,
July 2009,
at 25, 30, available at http://clearviewalliance.org/
docs/Texas%20High%2OWires%20article,%20electronic%20copy,%206-12-09.pdf.
244. Kate Galbraith, Fighting the Power Lines to Protect Hill Country Vstas, TEX. TRIB.
(Sept. 9 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-energy/wind-energy/fighting-power-linesprotect-hill-country-vistas/.
245. O'Grady, supranote 242.
246. MICHAEL O'SULLIVAN, NEXTERA ENERGY, BUILDING THE NEXT ERA OF CLEAN ENERGY:
NEXTERA ENGERY RESOURCES 2010-2014 30 (2010), available at http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW5OSUQNDQOMTdSQ2hpbGRJRDOtMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=l.
247. Lynn Doan, ERCOT CEO Predicts Private Transmission Build.out in Texas' Future,
SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Nov. 1, 2010.
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merchant and private transmission lines will surface across Texas to
248
carry wind-generated electricity to market."
According to the DOE, the success of this project has directly
resulted in less wind power curtailment in 2010 than there was in
2009.249 In fact, shortly after the line was completed on October 16,
2009, ERCOT "hit the highest level of 'instantaneous penetration' of
wind power as a percentage of load that it has ever reached" with
almost 25% of total demand met by wind power. 250 However, a side
effect of the project may be that landowners will expect utilities to
offer more money for transmission line easements, leading to an
increase in siting costs, litigation, and construction delays. 25' In late
2010, NextEra Energy offered to place the Texas Clean Energy
Express line into public service, essentially negating the need for a
252
similar line proposed as a part of the CREZ transmission buildout.
Landowners and utilities voiced opposition to this plan, which they
argued would set a bad precedent and negate years of planning that
had already gone behind the proposed CREZ line. 253 Despite the offer,
on January 24, 2011, the CREZ line received a final CCN, and
construction began on January 19, 2012.254
Thus, Texas is an important federalism example for electric
transmission as it comes closest to acting as an independent
"laboratory of democracy" without collaborating with other states.
That does not mean it always achieves maximum success. The state
has been criticized for not engaging in sufficient long-term planning
with regard to lines. For instance, some stakeholders had hoped that
ERCOT would use the planning process to spur the development of
765 kV lines instead of 345 kV lines to accommodate future renewable
248. Id.

249. WISER & BOLINGER, supra note 153, at viii. Wind power curtailment, or a reduction in
wind power generation, "occurs for two primary reasons: 1) lack of available transmission during
a particular time to incorporate some or all of the wind generation; or 2) high wind generation at
times of minimum or low load, and excess generation cannot be exported to other balancing areas
due to transmission constraints. In these instances, wind generation may be curtailed after other
generation is running at minimum and imports reduced or curtailed as well." SARI FINK, NAT'L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., WIND ENERGY CURTAILMENT CASE STUDIES MAY 2008 - MAY 2009, atl

(2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti46716.pdf.
250. Jeffrey Ryser, NextEra Builds a Line in 10 Months Hoping to Cash In on Wind in Texas,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 30, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 25170062.
251. O'Grady, supra note 242.
252. Lynn Doan, Texas Utilities, Consumers Skeptical of NextEra Offer of Transmission Line,
SNL POWER DAILY, Sept. 14, 2010.
253. Id.
254. Big Hill to Kendall Line, PUB. UTIL. COMM'N OF TEX. - CREZ, http:/www.
texascrezprojects.com/pagel13462032.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2012).
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energy growth and electricity demand despite the short-term
additional expense for such lines. 255 Instead, despite the benefits of the
765 kV lines for renewable energy and reliability in general, the state,
256
like most of the country, remains without them.
C. Regional TransmissionPolicy and Planning
As is clear from the discussion of federal and state regulation
governing transmission and renewable energy policy, the federal
government has encouraged states and utilities within states to
participate in regional collaborations for planning new transmission
lines and operating regional electric grids-and many utilities and
states have done so. Although participation in these regional
organizations is currently voluntary, and they do not have siting
authority and do not set policy for the states within them, they have
begun to play a more central role in recent years in transmission
planning and grid operating. This Section discusses the existing
RTOs, the transmission challenges they are undertaking, and the
extent to which they have made progress in addressing those
challenges.
As an initial matter, in order to help manage transmission
networks, FERC has promoted the formation of ISOs and RTOs. As
noted earlier, in 1996 FERC issued Orders 888 and 889, which led to
open access to the transmission system, and allowed for the formation
of ISOs.257 Order 888 states, "[W]e believe that ISOs have great
potential to assist us and the industry to help provide regional
efficiencies, to facilitate economically efficient pricing, and, especially
in the context of power pools, to remedy undue discrimination and

255. See, e.g., BRENDAN KIRBY, EVALUATING TRANSMISSION COSTS AND WIND BENEFITS IN
TEXAS: EXAMINING THE ERCOT CREZ TRANSMISSION STUDY 8-9 (2007), available at http://www

(discussing regulatory,
.consultkirby.com/files/EvaluatingTransmissionCostsInTexas.pdf
planning, and cost barriers to 765 kV transmission lines in Texas); see also AM. ELEC. POWER,
INTERSTATE

TRANSMISSION

VISION

FOR

WIND

INTEGRATION

5

(2007),

available

at

http://www.awea.org/documents/issues/upload/windtransmissionvisionwhitepaper.pdf
(discussing benefits of 765 kV lines for Texas and other parts of the country to maximize the
development of wind resources).
256. See AM. ELEC. POWER, supra note 255, at 8 (map showing existing 765 kV lines in PJM
region and vision for new 765 kV lines throughout the country to create a transmission
superhighway for wind); TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, THE ENERGY REPORT 342
http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/energy/pdf/96-1266Energy
(2008),
available
at
Report.pdf (stating that the ERCOT grid contains 38,000 miles of transmission lines, including
8,100 miles of 345 kV lines, 16,000 miles of 138 kV lines, and 11,500 miles of 69 kV lines).
257. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 626 (3d ed.

2010).
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mitigate market power."2 58 In 1999, FERC issued Order 2000 and
advanced the formation of RTOs.259 To further encourage RTO
development, FERC directed transmission-owning utilities either to
participate in an RTO or to explain their refusal to do so. Order 2000
did not require utilities to join RTOs. Instead, participation was
260
voluntary.
As noted earlier, there are six RTOs under FERC jurisdiction
across the country, some of which are single-state entities while others
cover multiple states. 26 '1 Despite the FERC orders encouraging
formation of RTOs and ISOs, "some regions of the country have
consistently opposed the RTO model, instead relying on in-state ISOs
or on individual utility-tariff filings with FERC to govern
transmission."' 262 Most of the states in the West, with the exception of
Texas, California, and those involved in MISO,are not part of an RTO
or ISO.263 These western states are, however, part of more loosely
formed power organizations, including the Western Electricity

258. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 75 FERC 61,080, p. 52 (Apr. 24, 1996).
259. Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC 61,285 (Dec. 20, 1999).
260. See Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(noting that participation was voluntary).
261. Dworkin et al., supra note 16, at 540. See also supra notes 105-09 and accompanying
text (discussing RTOs and ISOs).
262. BOSSELMAN ETAL., supra note 257, at 656.
263. Id.; see also Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FERC, http://www.
ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp (last visited August 8, 2011) (showing that
the Northwest and Southwest regions, both of which fill out the Western Interconnection, do not
have any ISOs or RTOs). As an example, Wyoming, Montana and parts of Oregon have
transmission providers that are members of the Northern Tier Transmission Group. FAQ, N.
TIER TRANSMISSION GROUP, http://www.nttg.biz/site/ (last visited August 8, 2011); see also David
J. Hurlbut, Multistate Decision Making for Renewable Energy, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 677, 697-98
(2010). In Oregon, Washington, and parts of western Montana, the majority of grid management
is maintained by the federal nonprofit agency the Bonneville Power Administration. The grid
managed by BPA contains mainly hydropower generation, and also contains 3,000 MW of
installed wind generation capacity. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA FACTS (2010) available
at
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/about-BPA/Facts/FactDocs/BPAFacts_20 lO.pdf.
Another
organization that fulfills a grid management role similar to an ISO or an RTO is the Western
Area Power Administration (WAPA), a power marketing administration within the DOE that
has 17,000 miles of transmission lines that it operates and maintains. WAPA markets

hydroelectric power across 15 states, including California, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. Facts about Western, W. AREA POWER
ADMIN., http://ww2.wapa.gov/sites/westerninewsroom/FactSheetsfPages/factsabout.aspx
(last
visited Sept. 5, 2012). Further, there are other non-RTO organizations, which actively work to
plan interstate transmission line construction projects, such as the Western Governors'
Association (WGA). See Regional Transmission Expansion Planning, W. GOVERNORS' ASS'N,
http://www.westgov.org/initiatives/rtep (lastvisited Sept. 27, 2012).
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Coordinating Council ("WECC")264 and the Western Area Power

5
Administration ("WAPA").26

This Section focuses specifically on the RTOs and other
transmission-planning organizations that cover more than one state in
order to show how utilities and states have attempted to work
together on a regional basis to plan for transmission and share costs,
even if authority for the actual siting of transmission lines remains,
for now, within each individual state. Thus, this Section discusses (1)
MISO (which, as a reminder, is the RTO covering a region of
266
midwestern states including Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa)

and (2) WECC and WAPA. 267 Although ERCOT in Texas and CAISO
in California fill similar transmission-planning roles, they operate
wholly within a single state and thus do not serve as examples of state
collaboration for region-wide transmission planning.
1. Midwest Independent System Operator
MISO applied for and was granted status as an RTO in
December 2001.268 As the FERC order granting RTO status stated, "a
properly formed RTO in the Midwest will greatly benefit the public
interest by enhancing the reliability of the Midwest electric grid and
facilitating and enhancing competition." 269 MISO covers portions of
thirteen states and Manitoba. 270 As of June 2011, MISO was
comprised of thirty-five members that own transmission lines,
including Xcel Energy (through its wholly owned subsidiary Northern
States Power Company), Ameren, Mid-American Energy, and Great

264. See About WECC, W. ELEC. COORDINATING COUNCIL, http://www.wecc.biz/About/Pages
/default.aspx (explaining composition of WECC).
265. See Facts About Western, supra note 263.
266. Corporate Information, MIDWEST ISO, (Sept. 2012), available at https://www.
midwestiso.org/LibraryRepository/Communication%20Material/Corporate/Corporate%2OFact%2
0Sheet.pdf.
267. See supranotes 263-65 (discussing the WECC and WAPA).
61,326, (Dec. 20, 2001);
268. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 97 FERC
61,169 (May 14, 2003)
see also Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 103 FERC
(denying rehearing of the December 20, 2001 order granting RTO status to MISO).
269. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 97 FERC 61,326.
270. Press Release, Midwest ISO, Annual Meeting Addresses Energy Challenges (Apr. 20,
2011), available at https:llwww.midwestiso.org/AboutUslMediaCenterlPressReleasesPages
/AnnualMeetingAddressesEnergyChallenges.aspx. For a map of MISO coverage, see Corporate
Information, supra note 266 (indicating that MISO covers all or parts of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin).
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River Energy. 27 1 On June 20, 2011, MISO set a record demand peak of
103,246 MW, surpassing the previous record set in 2006.272 In total,
the MISO footprint serves over 38 million people.2 7 3 Coal is the most
prominent fuel source in the MISO region, but over 10,000 MW of
wind is installed in the MISO area. 274 In 2009 an estimated 2.2% of
wind generation was curtailed, increasing to 4.4% curtailed in 2010 in
275
the MISO footprint.
Although MISO cannot itself adopt or impose an RPS, many of
its members have; while MISO does not have the ability to site
transmission lines, it "recognized that implementing RPSs would
require regionally compliant transmission portfolios that could
continue to deliver wholesale energy at the lowest possible total
cost."2 76 The Upper Midwest Transmission Development Initiative was
a subregional MISO planning effort initiated by the governors of Iowa,
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin to identify
renewable energy zones ("REZs") and associated transmission needs in
the Upper Midwest. 277 The creation of REZs is significant because they
were approved by each state and thus allowed MISO to engage in
long-term planning of zones that already had state support. Outputs
from this study and analysis of other MISO-state RPS goals then
served as inputs in the MISO 2009 Regional Generation Outlet Study.
The goal was to "[d]evelop regional transmission system(s) to
278
accompany, at a minimum, existing renewable portfolio standards."

271. MISO: Members by Sector, MIDWEST ISO (Aug. 2012), https://www.midwestiso.org/
Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/Corporate/Current%2Members%20by%20Secto
r.pdf;
Subsidiaries, XCEL
ENERGY, http://www.xcelenergy.com/AboutUs/Our-Company
/Governance/Subsidiaries (last visited Aug. 30, 2012); MIDWEST INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION
SYSTEM OPERATOR, REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION (RTO) RELIABILITY PLAN 25 (2011),

available
at
https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/Repository/Procedure
[MISO%20Reliability%20Plan.pdf.
272. Press Release, Midwest ISO, New Peak Demand Record Set in MISO Region (July 20,
2011), available at https://www.midwestiso.org/AboutUsfMediaCenter/PressReleases/Pages
/NewPeakRecordSetinMISORegion.aspx.
273. CorporateInformation, supra note 266.
274. Id.
275. RYAN WISER & MARK BOLINGER, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., 2010 WIND
TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 54 (2011), available at http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/wind/

pdfs/51783.pdf.
276. Regional Generation Outlet Study, MIDWEST ISO, https://www.midwestiso.org/Planning/
Pages/RegionalGenerationOutletStudy.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
277. David Boyd, Chairman, Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Address at the NARUC Electricity
Committee Meeting: Upper Midwest Transmission Development Initiative 3 (Feb. 16, 2009),
available at http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/Boyd.pdf.
278. MIDWEST ISO, RGOS PHASE I: PROCESS OVERVIEW 2 (2009), available at https://www.
midwestiso.org/Library/Repository/Study/RGOS/RGOS%20I%20051409.pdf.
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The project was led by MISO, and included the "assistance of state
regulators and industry stakeholders."' 27 9 The study was completed in
phases, with Phase I "concentrat[ing] on the transmission design
alternatives for the states in the western part of the MISO (North and
South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa and Illinois)."28° Phase II
expanded on this, looking at "renewable energy requirements for the
entire MISO footprint, resulting in the need for an exhaustive
transmission plan." 28 ' The final report, incorporating both near-term
and twenty-year time horizons, was issued in November 2010 and
identified three transmission expansion scenarios that "meet
respective state Renewable Portfolio Standards ("RPS") requirements
within the Midwest ISO footprint."28 2 Each of these scenarios
developed different grid architectures, one expanding the existing 345
kV high-voltage network and another laying out a 765 kV grid.
Also in 2010, MISO proposed a MVP pricing model, which was
designed in part to encourage investment in transmission by
facilitating the ability of investors to recoup costs. 28 3 After
consideration, FERC approved the MVP model in December 2010, and
the MISO Board approved the projects in December 2011.284 The
pricing model allows regionally oriented projects to have their costs
allocated across the MISO region on a "postage-stamp" (load-ratio
share) basis, and is estimated to cost an additional $0.62 to
$0.80/kWh. 2s 5 To be considered for MVP status, a proposed project

279. MIDWEST ISO, REGIONAL GENERATION OUTLET STUDY 1 (2010), available at https://
www.midwestiso.org[Library/Repository/Study/RGOS/Regional%20Generation%200utlet%2OStu
dy.pdf.
280. MIDWEST ISO, REGIONAL GENERATION OUTLET STUDY: PHASE I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

REPORT 5 (2009), available at https:/www.midwestiso.orglLibraryRepository/StudyfRGOS/
RGOSIExecutiveSummaryReport.FINAL.pdf.
281. Regional GenerationOutlet Study, supra note 276.
282. MIDWEST ISO, supra note 279.
283. Letter from Arthur W. Her, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Midwest ISO, to Kimberly D. Bose,
Sec'y, FERC 8 (July 15, 2010), available at https://www.midwestiso.org/LibraryfRepository
/Study/Entire%20Transmission%2OCost%20Allocation%2OFiling.pdf.
284. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 133 FERC 61,221 (Dec. 16, 2010);
Press Release, Midwest ISO, MISO Board Approves 215 New Transmission Projects (Dec. 8,
at
https://www.midwestiso.org/AboutUslMediaCenter/PressReleases
2011),
available
/Pages/MlSOBoardApproves2l5NewTransmissionProjects.aspx (discussing approval of 215 new
transmission infrastructure projects, including 16 new MVPs).
285. Letter from Arthur W. Iler, supra note 283, at 2. "Postage stamp" pricing is when the
costs of the project are allocated to the utilities in the MISO region based on the utilities'
percentage of the total energy load. SCOTT HEMPLING, NAT'L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST.,
POSTAGE STAMP TRANSMISSION PRICING: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVERSES FERC 2 (2009) defines

"postage stamp rate" as: "Every transmission customer pays a single rate for any transmission
transaction within a defined region, regardless of the contractual origin and contractual
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must (1) be developed through MISO's transmission-expansion
planning process for the purpose of meeting various energy policy laws
or mandates, (2) provide multiple economic benefits to multiple
regions while the project's total economic benefits are greater than the
total economic costs, or (3) address an issue related to a regional
reliability standard while the project's total economic benefits are
greater than the total economic costs. 28 6 In creating a new costallocation methodology for MVP projects, "Midwest ISO projects that
the MVP starter projects developed within the first five to ten years
following approval of the proposed MVP cost allocation methodology
will generate between $400 million to $1.3 billion in aggregate annual
adjusted production cost savings, spread almost evenly across all
28 7
Midwest ISO Planning Regions."
One of the MVP projects is one of the CapX2020 lines described
in Part II.B.1. 288 This will provide a huge financial benefit for the
utilities proposing the CapX2020 lines, because the approval of the
Brookings Line as an MVP project means that construction costs 28of9
more than $600 million will be spread across all utilities in MISO.
This would likely leave less than $100 million of the bill to be paid
directly by the CapX2020 utilities, which make up approximately 14%
of MISO's energy production.29 0 For this project, the allocation of cost
is a particularly important issue, and in May 2010 the CapX2020
utilities informed the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission that it
would delay construction by two years due to cost-allocation
291
concerns.

destination of the electricity transmitted. That rate is the same rate for every customer." In this
way the rate is similar to the rate paid for postage stamps in that it costs the same amount to
mail a letter within the United States regardless of its origin, destination, or distance traveled.
For information on the cost estimates, see MIDWEST ISO, MISO TRANSMISSION EXPANSION PLAN
2011, at 6 (2011), available at https://www.midwestiso.org/Planning/TransmissionExpansion
Planning/Pages/MTEPll.aspx. In 2010, the average U.S. household used a little less than 1,000
kWh per month. Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Electricity Does an American Home
Use?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=97&t=3 (last updated
Dec. 6, 2011).
286. Letter from Arthur W. Iler, supranote 283, at 21-24.
287. Id. at 16.
288. MIDWEST ISO, TRANSMISSION EXPANSION PLAN 2010, at 264 (2010), available at
https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/Repository/Study/MTEPMTEP10/MTEPIO%2OReport.pdf.
289. Bob Geiger, MISO Cost-allocationFormula Could Save CapX2020 Utilities $600M on
Power Line, FIN. & COMMERCE, July 17, 2010, available at http://www.dolanmedia.com/view
.cfm?recID=612729.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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Not all parties are happy with FERC's approval of the MP
Some state commissions and MISO itself have argued that
the rule is not broad enough and should allow costs to be passed on to
neighboring RTOs as well. 293 Specifically, the concern is that the
eastern PJM RTO will use MISO's wind energy to meet its members'
RPS goals, and as a result should be forced to pay for the benefit of
utilizing new transmission lines to reach those wind resources. 294 On
the other hand, Michigan interest groups have argued that the rule
unfairly imposes costs for which Michigan utilities will see little
benefit. 29 5 In general, these groups contend that "Michigan's
renewable portfolio standard specifies that it has to be met with instate renewables, thus it will get nothing out of lines designed to meet
other jurisdictions' targets."296 Furthermore, these interest groups
assert that "Michigan is on two peninsulas and the lower is
electrically islanded from the rest of MISO, meaning its customers will
get little-to-no benefit from MVP lines elsewhere." 297 The State of
Michigan, utilities, and interest groups have filed a federal lawsuit
challenging both FERC Order 1000 and MISO's cost-allocation
structure, and some of the utilities have also threatened to leave
MISO. 298
Additionally, the Illinois Commerce Commission, along with the
utility Exelon, claimed that the new rule suffers from the same
deficiencies as a similar cost-sharing method that the PJM RTO had
model.29 2

292. See Many Players in MISO Join Challenge of MVP Allocation, RESTRUCTURING TODAY
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.restructuringtoday.com/public/12883.cfm; see also FERC Hears from
Unhappy with MVP, RESTRUCTURING TODAY (Jan. 18, 2011),
MISO Members
http://www.restructuringtoday.com/public/12871print.cfm (noting that such parties included the
Organization of MISO states and two of its members).
293. See Many Players in MISO Join Challenge of MVP Allocation, supra note 292
(explaining that the "bulk of the MISO Transmission Owners also want to see FERC allow MVP
costs to be allocated to exports into [the PJM RTO]"); see also FERC Hears from MISO Members
Unhappy with MVP, supra note 292 (noting that OMS believes that the neighboring PJM RTO
should cover a portion of the costs).
294. See FERC Hears from MISO Members Unhappy with MVP, supra note 292 ("Without
significant offshore wind development, OMS believes the neighbor RTO would draw much of its
wind energy to meet state mandates from MISO and they should have to pay for it.").
295. Many Players in MISO Join Challenge of MVP Allocation, supra note 292.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Daniel Cusick, Midwest Grid Needs Upgrades for Wind Power, but Cost-sharing
Plan Draws Fire in

Michigan, GOVERNORS'

WIND

ENERGY COALITION

(Mar. 12,

2012),

53
1 (describing the federal lawsuit filed "on
http://www.governorswindenergycoalition.org/?p=1
behalf of the MISO Northeast Transmission Customer Coalition-which includes Attorney
General Bill Schuette and rate-based utilities Detroit Edison and Consumers Energy").
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implemented. 299 For "backbone" transmission projects larger than 500
kV, which are best able to move large amounts of electricity, the PJM
process provided that all customers within PJM would pay a portion of
the costs of those projects regardless of their location, based on the
300
assumption that the upgrades would benefit all customers.
In 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
struck down the PJM rule, holding that "FERC is not authorized to
approve a pricing scheme that requires a group of utilities to pay for
facilities from which its members derive no benefits, or benefits that
are trivial in relation to the costs sought to be shifted to its
members. 301 The court acknowledged that with large-scale reliability
upgrades, the risk of system-wide failure is reduced and thus it is
likely that all utilities will see at least some incremental benefit;
without any quantification or analysis, however, the court found it
was likely that this small benefit was grossly disproportionate to the
302
allocated costs.
In contrast to PJM's automatic pro rata cost sharing for large
reliability upgrades, MISO's MVP methodology attempted "to ensure
fair allocation of the cost to the beneficiaries of a regionally beneficial
transmission investment." 303 The approved
seventeen MVP
transmission line projects are spread across the entire region and
bundled together to ensure that the benefits of the total portfolio
accrue pro rata across the region. 30 4 Furthermore, as opposed to the
PJM cost-sharing method which looked only at reliability benefits,
MISO explicitly considered additional benefits such as "advancing
state and federal energy public policies, reductions in production costs
and losses, reduced capacity requirements, and increased reliability,
30 5
which accrue broadly tocustomers across the Midwest ISO region."
299. FERC Hears from MISO Members Unhappy with MVP,supra note 292.
300. STAN

MARK

KAPLAN

&

ADAM

VANN,

CONG.

RESEARCH

SERV.,

ELECTRICITY

TRANSMISSION COST ALLOCATION 7 (2010), available at http://www.wiresgroup.com/images/
WIRESReportCostAlloc_041910.pdf.
301. Ill.
Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009).
302. Id. ("Because the transmission lines in PJM's service region are interconnected, a
failure in one part of the region can affect the supply of electricity in other parts of the network.
So utilities and their customers in the western part of the region could benefit from highervoltage transmission lines in the east, but nothing in FERC's opinions in this case enables even
the roughest of ballpark estimates of those benefits.").
303. MIDWEST ISO, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2010), available at https://www.midwestiso
.orgl layoutslmisolecmlredirect.aspx?id=99072.
304. Letter from Arthur W. Iler, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Midwest ISO, to Kimberly D. Bose,
Sec'y, FERC 3-4 (March 27, 2012), available at https://www.midwestiso.org/Library
/Repository/Tariff/FERC%20Filings/2012-03-27%20Docket%2No.%20ER 10-1791-OOO.pdf.
305. Letter from Arthur W. Iler, supra note 283, at 13-14.
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Estimating benefits across the region is an inexact science, but even
the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that precision is not necessary, only
an effort to align cost and benefits. 30 6 As Judge Posner noted:
We do not suggest that the Commission has to calculate benefits to the last penny, or for
that matter to the last million or ten million or perhaps hundred million dollars ....
If it
cannot quantify the benefits to the midwestern utilities from new 500 kV lines in the
East... but it has an articulable and plausible reason to believe that the benefits are at
least roughly commensurate with those utilities' share of total electricity sales in PJM's
region ... the Commission can approve PJM's proposed pricing scheme on that basis. 307

Therefore, in its effort to correlate costs and benefits, and through its
findings to that effect, 308 the MISO's MVP pricing methodology may be
more defensible under the Seventh Circuit's cost-benefit analysis.
2. Western Electricity Coordinating Council and Western Area Power
Administration
Unlike the midwestern states that make up MISO, the
majority of states in the Western Interconnection do not belong to an
organized market, but are loosely joined within WECC, which focuses
on ensuring electric reliability in the region. 309 In 2009, WECC was
awarded $14.5 million from the ARRA to use for transmission
planning across the Western Interconnection, comprised of all or part
of fourteen states (along with the Canadian Provinces of Alberta and
British Columbia and Northern Baja Mexico). 310 Managed by the
Transmission Expansion Planning Policy Committee, this project will
allow the WECC region to assess future transmission needs, engage in
stakeholder planning, and create both ten- and twenty-year
transmission plans. 311 The WECC also serves as the umbrella
organization for many subregional transmission-planning efforts
within the Western Interconnection. 312 WECC is responsible for

306. Ill. Commerce Corm'n, 576 F.3d at 477.
307. Id.
308. Letter from Arthur W. Iler, supra note 283, at 24-26.
309. See W. ELECT. COORDINATING COUNCIL,

COMPANY OVERVIEW (2012), available at

http://www.wecc.biz/About/Documents/WECC-FactSheet.pdf (providing a company overview of
the coverage and purpose of the WECC).
310. See id. (listing areas included in the Western Interconnection); see also Transmission
Expansion Planning, W.

ELECT.

COORDINATING

COUNCIL,

http://www.wecc.biz/Planning/

TransmissionExpansionPages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (describing the receipt by
WECC of funding from the DOE under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act).
311. Transmission Expansion Planning,supra note 310.
312. See W. ELECT. COORDINATING COUNCIL, FREQUENTLY-ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) ABOUT
TRANSMISSION PLANNING IN THE WESTERN INTERCONNECTION 2, available at http://www.wecc.biz

/committees/BOD/TEPPC/External/RTEPFAQs.pdf

(indicating that the WECC subregional
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ensuring that the electric grid is reliable within the Western
Interconnection and that transmission access is fair. WECC worked
with the Western Governors Association ("WGA") in 2009 to identify
western renewable energy zones ("WREZs") and to work with
stakeholders to identify transmission needs for the region. 313 The
resulting report examined technological potential for wind, solar,
biomass, geothermal, and hydropower across the western region.3 14
The WRA has worked to ensure that WREZs are developed and
linked to transmission, but it finds current transmission planning in
the region insufficient: "While some of these lines will reach WREZ
hubs, most will remain inaccessible. Continued isolated procurement
by individual utilities will not lead to major development of these
renewable-rich areas and the requisite transmission."' 31 5 The WGA
commissioned a report that documented interviews with western
utilities. The report found that, while the utilities were interested in
developing WREZs near their service territories, they were not
interested in developing more economically optimal WREZs not yet
connected to transmission. 31 6 Additionally, the surveyed utilities that
were not located in a state with an aggressive RPS did not believe that
they would need to meet a high renewable energy target within the
next ten to twenty years, highlighting the barriers that inconsistent
federal and state policies pose for WREZ development and
coordination. 317 The report also identified challenges in developing
transmission lines across more than one state. 313 Utilities cited state
differences in local siting procedures and cost-recovery risk with
interstate projects as major barriers. 319 The future coordination and
planning necessary to develop WREZs will depend on local utilities
and state PUCs, as well as state and federal policies to promote
renewable energy.
Another organization that fulfills a grid-management role
similar to an ISO or an RTO is WAPA, which is a division of the DOE
groups include the California Independent Service Operator ("CAISO"), Sierra Subregional
Planning Group ("SSPG"), Southwest Area Transmission ("SWAT"), Colorado Coordinated
Planning Group ("CCPG"), Northern Tier Transmission Group ("NTTG"), Columbia Grid, British
Columbia Transmission Corporation ("BCTC"), and Alberta Electric System Operator ("AESO")).
313. W. GOVERNORS' ASS'N & U.S. DEPt OF ENERGY, WESTERN RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES -

PHASE I REPORT 2 (2009), availableat http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/WREZ09.pdf.
314. Id. at 6.
315. Id. at 1.
316. Id. at 2.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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that markets power. 320 WAPA markets hydroelectric power across
fifteen states, including California, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.3 2 1 Additionally,
3 22
WAPA operates and maintains 17,100 miles of transmission lines.
In its 2010 annual report, WAPA highlighted the need for new
transmission construction to facilitate renewable energy. 323 Although
the planning process for these lines does not appear to be as involved
as it is for MISO, there is a list of lines proposed as transmission
324
construction projects.
D. Summary
As shown in this Part, state policy governing renewable energy
and transmission line siting, as well as the corresponding lack of
significant federal policy, has a major influence on where and how
transmission lines are built and which projects are viable. Although
FERC has identified parts of the eastern United States as having the
most critical need for additional transmission infrastructure, it is the
midwestern and western states that have been most active in
beginning to implement major transmission projects to develop and
connect renewable resources to population centers on a regional basis.
Moreover, certain RTOs and ISOs at the regional level, particularly
MISO, have been very proactive about integrating state renewable
energy policy into their planning processes.
With these state and regional examples in mind, Part III
highlights the challenges the United States faces in expanding the
grid and incorporating renewable energy in light of the significant
siting and permitting authority at the state level and the limited
authority at the federal level. Part III also explores some policy
options at the federal, regional, and state levels for addressing these
challenges.

III. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR TRANSMISSION POLICY
A review of the various state policies and transmission projects
and the development of regional RTOs shows that RTOs, particularly
320. Facts About Western, supra note 263.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. W. AREA POWER ADMIN., ROADMAP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY: ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at

4 (2010), availableat http://ww2.wapa.gov/sites/western/newsroom/Documents/annreplO.pdf.
324. Id. at 14.
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MISO, have made major steps in planning and proposing the types of
interstate transmission lines needed to bring renewable energyparticularly wind energy-from more remote areas in one state to
population centers in that state and in neighboring states. Texas is an
example of a state that, because it is an electricity island, can more
easily decide to build transmission lines to support its state renewable
energy policy. MISO is an example of a multistate RTO that has taken
major steps to integrate the RPSs and other renewable energy goals of
its member states into transmission planning. Still, the process is
slow, and cost-allocation disputes over regional lines have been a huge
barrier to planning and implementation. Moreover, a review of
federal, state, and regional authority over transmission line siting
shows that most of that authority still rests with the states. This
makes it difficult to plan and build regional transmission lines. The
federal government has little authority to influence the siting of lines
in areas where states have been reluctant to site such lines as a result
of stakeholder opposition. Although the EPAct 2005 and the FERC
rules regarding NIETCs and federal backstop siting authority
attempted to address this concern, courts have rejected FERC's efforts
to exercise this authority. 325 Thus, additional federal authority as well
as action at the state and regional level may be necessary to facilitate
the construction of transmission lines to support renewable energy
development. This Part sets forth some options for new siting and
planning policies that would help break down some of these barriers
and also discusses the critical issue of cost allocation for regional
transmission lines.
A. Options for Reallocating Siting Authority
The question of how to site additional interstate transmission
lines to transport renewable energy from resource-rich states to
population centers is front and center as politicians, regulators,
environmentalists, renewable energy advocates, the renewable energy
business community, utilities, and other stakeholders consider how
best to develop these resources, particularly wind. None of these
groups need to write on a completely clean slate. Instead, there are
existing models for increased federal siting authority, existing tools for
increased regional authority, and state-level models that can allow
more individual states to take the lead in creating a more hospitable
325. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1138 (2010); supranotes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Piedmont case).
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forum for merchant transmission and other development. Ultimately,
we conclude that complete federal preemption of state siting authority
for transmission lines is simply not politically feasible at the current
time and will not be unless and until the nation has a major
transmission crisis with significant blackouts. While such a crisis may
happen, in the absence of one, we favor either a "process preemption"
approach using the current federal model for siting cell phone towers
or a movement toward regional collaborations with an ultimate
transfer of at least some state siting authority to regional
organizations through interstate compacts or other legal mechanisms.
We discuss below (1) the full preemption option, (2) the process
preemption option, and (3) increased regional siting authority.
1. Federal Preemption of State Siting Authority
Clean energy advocates as well as some state utility regulators
look to federal preemption of state siting authority as a way to break
down current barriers to developing interstate transmission lines to
meet state renewable energy goals. An obvious potential model is the
federal structure in place for interstate natural gas pipelines, where
FERC (or its predecessor agencies) has served as the primary siting
authority for over sixty years. Congress passed the Natural Gas Act
("NGA") in 1938, stating, "The business of transporting and selling
natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a
public interest, and that Federal regulation in matters relating to the
transportation of natural gas and sale thereof in interstate and foreign
commerce is necessary in the public interest."326 The process for
federal siting of interstate natural gas pipelines involves acquiring a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from FERC, which
then grants the pipeline owner eminent domain authority. 327 This

326. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2006); see also Donald H. Gaucher, Federal JurisdictionOver Natural
Gas, 1 HouS. L. REV. 29, 31 (1963) (discussing the purpose of the Natural Gas Act).
327. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)-(h) (2006) (requiring the certificate of public convenience and
necessity); see also Robert R. Nordhaus & Emily Pitlick, Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Regulation, 30
ENERGY L.J. 85, 88-89 (2009) ("A pipeline operator cannot engage in the transportation or sale of
natural gas, or service, construct, extend, or acquire a natural gas pipeline without obtaining a
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the FERC. The FERC will issue such a
certificate only if required by the present or future public convenience and necessity. The FERC
may impose conditions on the certificate and has the power to determine the service area to be
covered. Perhaps the most valuable tool in the [Natural Gas Act] is the right of eminent domain
granted to the holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. These provisions from
section 7 of the [Natural Gas Act], combined with section 4 (rates and charges) and section 5
(fixing rates and charges), have led the courts to repeatedly interpret the [Natural Gas Act] as
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federal authority is noticeably absent in the realm of transmission line
siting, with predicable consequences. As Professor Richard Pierce has
noted, if FERC had not possessed the power to authorize expansion of
natural gas transportation capacity, the gas-distribution system would
be much less reliable and much more expensive than it is now. 328 He
also notes that because the legal regime governing transmission lines
still rests squarely with the states, that same level of cost control and
reliability will remain elusive absent significant changes to the
329
current system.
Beyond the uncertain backstop authority that Congress
granted FERC in the EPAct 2005, Congress declined to expand FERC
authority over the siting of transmission lines, choosing instead to
leave this authority with the states. Although members of Congress
have introduced bills in recent years to strengthen FERC's backstop
authority in response to the judicial decisions limiting that authority
under the EPAct 2005, passage of any of these or similar bills is
330
unlikely at the present time.
Despite its reluctance to increase federal siting authority for
transmission lines, Congress has been willing to expand such federal
authority in recent years in other areas where it apparently saw a
greater need to override obstacles to siting energy-related facilities.
Notably, although FERC has long had authority to site natural gas
pipelines, state and local governments have traditionally assumed
authority over siting liquefied natural gas ("LNG") terminals. LNG
terminals receive shipments of LNG from foreign sources and regasify
(i.e., heat the liquid natural gas to allow it to evaporate back into
natural gas), store, and prepare the natural gas for distribution in
domestic pipelines. 3 3 1 As a result of local and state opposition to the
siting of such terminals, 33 2 Congress, in the EPAct 2005, granted
providing for exclusive and preemptive federal siting of interstate natural gas pipelines."
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e)-(h) (2006)).
328. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transition to Completive Markets in Natural Gas
and Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, 334 (1994).
329. Id. at 333-34.
330. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing unsuccessful efforts by
Congress to expand federal authority).
331. Christopher M. Crane, State Authority in Siting of Liquefied Natural Gas Import
Terminals, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2006).
332. See Joan M. Darby, Janet M. Robins & Beth L. Webb, The Role of FERC and the States
in Approving and Siting Interstate Natural Gas Facilitiesand LNG Terminals after the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 - Consultation,Preemption and Cooperative Federalism, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS &
ENERGY L. 335, 336 (2010) (suggesting that Congress passed the EPAct 2005 in recognition of
state opposition to "impending FERC-certificated projects"); see also Jacob Dweck, David
Wochner & Michael Brooks, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy Act
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FERC exclusive authority to site the terminals. 3 3 The EPAct 2005
preempts relevant laws, including those that require more stringent
standards for siting natural gas facilities. 3 34 Congress relied on its
Commerce Clause power to preempt state authority and declared that
"[t]he business of transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate
distribution to the public is affected with a public interest ... ,,35 The
EPAct 2005 also streamlined the process for reviewing FERC's siting
decisions for natural gas terminals by granting the federal courts of
appeals (in whichever circuit the facility is located) exclusive
jurisdiction. 336
of 2005: State Powers in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L.J. 473, 474 (2006) ("Energy
infrastructure raises unique concerns, specifically in the post-September 11 environment. As a
result, LNG has engendered huge opposition in many of the communities in which it has been
proposed and those communities have methods by which they can negatively impact the review
and regulatory processing of LNG terminals. The primary tools available to LNG opposition are
the powers, embedded in various federal and state laws, which the states have to affect LNG
terminal siting. Aware of the potential delay caused by some of these tools and recognizing that
states may react to satiate local opposition, Congress passed, and the President signed, the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 ....
").
333. Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§311, 313, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2006).
334. Id. For a summary of how the EPAct carved out a participatory role for the states in
siting natural gas terminals, see Crane, supra note 331 at 32-33:
Section 311(c)(1) amends [Natural Gas Act] section 3 to provide FERC exclusive
authority to review applications "for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation
of an LNG terminal." Section 311(c)(2) reserves states' right to administrate the
[Coastal Zone Management Acti, [Clean Air Acti, and [Clean Water Act]. EPAct 2005
requires FERC to implement a "pre-filin' procedure for terminal applications which
encourages applicant cooperation with state and local officials. States must designate
an agency to consult with FERC on state and local safety considerations during
application review. The state agency may provide an advisory report to FERC on
safety issues, to which FERC must respond. In addition, states may conduct safety
inspections of operating LNG terminals to evaluate facility conformance with federal
regulations. The LNG terminals emergency response plan must include consultation
with state and local officials .... [The] EPAct 2005 provides for a minimum of three
"federal-state" forums to foster dialogue and promote public education on federal and
state siting and permitting processes, federal safety regulations, and response
strategies.
335. 15 U.S.C. §717(a) (2006); see also William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk,
Preemption,and the Floor/CeilingDistinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1553 (2007) ("The Energy
Act turned the hierarchy upside down, replacing state and local LNG siting choice with a
commenting role in a siting decision now made by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC)."); Gregory J. Rigano, The Solution to the United States' Energy Troubles is Blowing in
the Wind, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 229 (2011) (outlining Congressional authority for this
preemption under the Commerce Clause).
336. Rigano, supra note 335, at 230-31. See also Dweck et al., supra note 332, at 474 ("The
EPAct 2005 amended the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) to streamline the process for approving
natural gas projects, including LNG import terminals. The EPAct 2005 expressly provided the
FERC with exclusive authority over applications to site, construct, and operate LNG terminals.
It also provided a direct, expedited appeal to the U.S. courts of appeals from most agency
decisions authorized under federal law, and authorized the FERC to create a binding schedule
for agencies reviewing projects under the FERC's jurisdiction. To facilitate the process, the
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Adopting a federal preemption model to overcome the current
barriers to transmission line siting could involve granting FERC full
siting authority over new, high-voltage transmission assets that are
necessary for states to meet their RPS targets. FERC would be a onestop shop, acting as the lead agency for coordinating all requisite
authorizations and reviews needed to plan and construct new
transmission lines. Furthermore, legislation could grant renewable
energy developers first priority for connecting to the grid and longterm capacity rights for transmission improvements that are
3 37
necessary for states to meet their RPS targets.
The likelihood that Congress would completely or even
significantly strip states of siting authority for interstate transmission
lines, as it did for interstate natural gas pipelines, appears remote at
best based on differences in the political climate between 1938 and
now, as well as differences in the regulatory structure governing
pipelines in 1938 and transmission lines now. The NGA came on the
heels of several years of significant New Deal legislation, including the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, 338 the establishment of the Securities and
34
Exchange Commission in 1934, 339 the Social Security Act of 1935, 0

and the Fair Labor Standards Act of

1938.341

The political climate that

led to the New Deal was spurred by the Great Depression and a new
voting generation that had grown up experiencing the "abuses of
industrialism."' 34 2 Unlike the most recent presidential
and
congressional elections, which were closely contested, Franklin
FERC is required to institute a prefiling process, consult states in the application process, and
create a single consolidated record for appeals from all agency decisions.").
337. See Matthew Slavin & Jason J. Zeller, No Grid, No Gain: Untanglingthe Transmission
Tie-up,

RENEWABLE

ENERGY

WORLD

(Apr.

15,

2011),

http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/print/article/20 11/04/no-grid- no-gainuntangling-the-transmission-tie-up (suggesting that Congress "mimic the authority FERC currently
possesses for siting of interstate natural gas pipelines and apply it to renewable energy projects").
338. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 703 (2006)) (protecting collective bargaining rights for unions), invalidated by A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); National Labor Relations Act of
1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006))
(prohibiting unfair labor practices).
339. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006))
(regulating the stock market to prevent abuses similar to those that led to the Great Depression).
340. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)) (repealed 1972)
(providing retirement and death benefits).
341. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2006))
(requiring a minimum wage and overtime pay).
342. Samuel Lubell, The Roosevelt Coalition, in THE NEW DEAL: ANALYSIS &
INTERPRETATION 129, 131 (Alonzo L. Hamby ed., 1969).
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Roosevelt won reelection in a landslide in 1936, and his party enjoyed
43
a majority in Congress.
Throughout the 1930s, the focus of politics shifted away from
state and local levels of government and emphasized new and
significant federal regulation of markets and monopolies by both
Congress and newly created federal agencies. 344 The interstate natural
gas industry was relatively new in the 1930s, with the first longdistance pipeline built in 1931. By 1935, states struggled to regulate
interstate pipeline companies, particularly when it came to rates. 345
The Federal Trade Commission undertook an investigation of the
industry and found discrimination, overcharging of customers, and
"highhandedness against producers," who often had little choice
regarding pipeline access. 3 46 In response, Congress passed the NGA,
347
which was designed to reduce this exploitation.
The NGA was not, however, designed to strip states of their
regulatory power. 348 Rather, it was intended to fill the regulatory gap
349 It
that existed when natural gas passed from one state to another.
was also designed to allow the federal government to encourage
competition among pipelines and ensure an "adequate, reliable and
reasonably-priced supply of natural gas for the entire nation."3 50 As

343. Id. at 143.
344. See Hirman Caton, Progressivismand Conservatism During the New Deal in THE NEW
DEAL AND ITS LEGACY: CRITIQUE AND REAPPRAISAL 177, 183 (Robert Eden ed., 1989) (noting that
"New Dealers and Federalists ... construed the fiscal and legislative powers of government as a
distinct force supervening on the market"); Sidney M. Milkis, New Deal Party Politics,
Administrative Reform, and the Transformationof the American Constitution, in THE NEW DEAL
AND ITS LEGACY: CRITIQUE AND REAPPRAISAL 123, 131 (Robert Eden ed., 1989) (describing FDR's
effective "nationalization of the political system"). See generally Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal
and the Problem of Monopoly, in THE NEW DEAL: ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION 73 (Alonzo L.
Hamby ed., 1969) (providing a broad overview of how New Deal programs regulated monopolies).
345. John T. Miller, Jr., Competition in Regulated Industries: Interstate Natural Gas
Pipelines, 47 GEO. L.J. 224, 230 (1958). See also Gaucher, supra note 326, at 30-31 (explaining
that local rate-setting arose as a problem shortly after the development of long-distance pipeline
technology).
346. Miller, Jr., supra note 345, at 230.
347. Id. at 231.
348. Ralph Sargent, Jr., Regulation of Natural Gas-Federal v. State, 27 DICTA 216, 218
(1950) (quoting Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1947)).
349. Id.; see also Alfred E. McLane, Jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission Over
Production and Gatheringof Gas, 28 TUL. L. REV. 343, 343 (1954) (explaining that a primary
purpose of the NGA was "to regulate activities of gas companies which had not been theretofore
subject to regulation").
350. Rachel Clingman & Audrey Cumming, The 2005 Energy Policy Act: Analysis of the
JurisdictionalBasis for Federal Siting of LNG Facilities,2 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 57, 72
(2007); Miller, Jr., supra note 345, at 232; see also 15 U.S.C. § 717f(g) (2006) (authorizing the
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the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared, the NGA's purpose was
"to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas
companies." 35 1 By comparison, today's sprawling electrical network
and its high-voltage, long-distance transmission lines have grown
from local, decentralized companies, municipal utilities, or rural
electric cooperatives. The technology and industry are well established
and in large part regulated so as to protect consumers from
exploitation.
On the other hand, one might still look to the more recent
federal preemption of LNG terminal siting in 2005 for a sign of hope
for a transfer of state siting authority to the federal government.
There too, however, significant differences exist. Federal preemption
of LNG terminal siting has been a live issue since 1979, even though
the transfer of siting authority did not take place until 2005. Since the
1970s, Congress has considered establishing federal authority over
siting LNG terminals for several reasons, including confusion over the
siting powers of states and various federal agencies, concern for
352
safety, and the need to ensure an adequate supply of natural gas.
Moreover, beginning in the 1970s, several states enacted specific
restrictions on the siting of LNG facilities within their borders,
resulting in legal challenges by gas distribution companies and
pressure on Congress to act.3 53 Other potentially relevant differences
include the increase in natural gas prices leading up to 2005 and lower
354
costs due to new technology developed to regasify and store LNG.
While one may argue that the challenges facing the
transmission grid may soon be sufficiently significant as to require a
similar response from Congress, we conclude that the situation must
become much more dire than it already is for Congress to support such
a massive transfer of authority from the states to the federal
government. Federal legislation granting FERC the exclusive right to
site interstate transmission lines would strip states of a regulatory
power they currently possess. Given the differences in the nature of
Commission to "grant certificates of public convenience and necessity for service of an area
already being served by another natural gas company").
351. Jane L. Bloom, State Regulation of Liquefied Natural Gas FacilitiesSiting: A Case for
Federal Preemption?, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 7, 25 (1979) (quoting Fed. Power Comm'n
v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 631 (1972)).
352. See generally id.
353. Id. at 13-14.
354. See Sheila Slocum Hollis, Should We Site It Here? LNG, the Environment, and
Federalism, 2 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POLY J. 5, 6 (2007) (explaining the factors that influenced
the development of the siting of LNG terminals). Since the development of shale gas, of course,
natural gas prices have fallen significantly.

2012]

INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION CHALLENGES

1865

the electric transmission industry and the natural gas industry (both
in 1938 and 2005), as well as the current political climate, it is
unlikely that federal legislation like the NGA or the new siting
provisions for LNG terminals is presently a viable solution for
addressing the inefficiencies associated with state authority for
transmission line siting.
2. Process Preemption as a Middle Ground
Another option, however, is the model Congress adopted in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ('TCA") for the siting of cell phone
towers. 355 Professor Ashira Pelman Ostrow has discussed the current
barriers to siting renewable energy facilities (as opposed to
transmission lines) and advocates for retaining a mix of federal and
local control, known as "process preemption,"356 for the siting
processes. 357 Ostrow contends that "[a]ggressive federal preemption
regimes that exclude local decisionmakers from the siting process
falter because local opposition, in contrast to local authority, cannot be
358
preempted."
Ostrow and Professor Patricia Salkin look favorably upon the
TCA's Telecommunications Siting Policy, which leaves siting authority
in local hands, but constrains local decisionmaking and provides
federal remedies for those who are denied approval. 359 Thus, the
Telecommunications Siting Policy preempts the siting process but
without disempowering local governments. The TCA was enacted with
the twin goals of "increasing competition in the telecommunications
360
industry" and "expanding wireless service" across the country.
Before passage of the TCA, local opposition to cell phone tower siting
often led to significant delays in permitting and construction of
towers. 36 1 The Telecommunications Siting Policy's collaboration
between federal and state decisionmaking has led to the siting of tens

355. See 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2006) (establishing local
state and local governments).
356. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemptionin
LEGIS. 289, 291 (2011).
357. Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 146, at 1054.
358. Ostrow, supra note 356, at 291.
359. Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 146, at 1053.
360. Camille Rorer, Can You See Me Now? The
NIMBY, 19 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 213, 214-15
361. Salkin & Ostrow, supranote 146, at 1088.

control but preempting some actions of
Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON

Struggle between Cellular Towers and
(2005).
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of thousands of telecommunications facilities, 362 a dramatic increase
that has "contribut[ed] to the development of a national
telecommunications network."3 63 Ostrow notes that this structure's
"hybrid federal-local framework" creates an interjurisdictional siting
has
policy that balances national and local land use priorities and3 64
developers.
use
land
with
cooperate
to
regulators
local
encouraged
The TCA operates by balancing local concerns against broader
national interests. 365 It prevents local authorities from banning
facilities outright 366 and from "unreasonably discriminat[ing] among
providers." 367 Authorities are required to respond to siting requests
within a reasonable period of time and decisions must be in writing
and supported by substantial evidence. 368 A party prohibited from
siting a facility may take its claim to a federal court, where the claim
will be decided on an expedited basis, 369 thus increasing "the

legitimacy, consistency, and public acceptance of controversial siting
decisions."3 70 Although states are somewhat constrained by the TCA,
they may decide whether, where, and how to site facilities in
371
accordance with local preferences.
Even the TCA approach may be optimistic as a model for
transmission-siting authority given the current hostility to
transferring any authority in this area from the states to the federal
government. Nevertheless, it does present an approach that might
streamline and make more uniform state processes in a way that
would be helpful for interstate lines that need approvals in multiple
states, while still leaving significant authority at the state and local
levels.
Thus, there are some existing models of federal siting authority
that Congress could adopt or modify in order to encourage interstate
transmission corridors for increased grid reliability and/or to
362. See Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 146, at 1091 (describing the increase in the number of
cell towers since the enactment of the TCA).
363. Ostrow, supra note 356, at 293.
364. Id. at 292-93.
365. Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 146, at 1082-83; see also ATC Realty, LLC v. Town of
Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (describing the TCA as balancing the national interest
of "accelerat[ing] the deployment of telecommunications technology" with "the desire to preserve
state and local control over zoning matters").
366. Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 146, at 1093.
367. Id. at 1090 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i) (2006)).
368. Id. at 1093, 1095.
369. Id. at 1090.
370. Ostrow, supra note 356, at 293-94.
371. Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 146, at 1090.
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encourage transport of renewable energy from resource-rich states to
population centers. Significant support in Congress and among the
public for such a solution, however, is unlikely until the country is
faced with a significant transmission crisis that strands investment in
renewable energy and hinders the ability of the states to meet their
policy goals. If and when that happens, Congress will likely look to
these existing federal siting models for guidance. In the meantime,
however, states, groups of states, and RTOs can use their own tools to
encourage more effective interstate transmission development. These
tools are discussed below.
3. Regional Siting Agencies
As noted earlier, although RTOs such as MISO are already
engaged in interstate transmission line planning, the authority for
actual siting of lines remains with the states. There is an opportunity
through the EPAct 2005, however, to create regional transmissionsiting agencies through interstate compacts. 372 The EPAct 2005
authorized three or more contiguous states to enter into an interstate
compact, subject to approval by Congress, which would establish a
regional transmission-siting agency to (1) determine need for future
electric transmission facilities within those states, and (2) carry out
the transmission-siting responsibilities of those states. Under the law,
the regional transmission-siting agency would have authority to
"review, certify, and permit siting of transmission facilities, including
facilities in national interest electric transmission corridors (other
than facilities on property owned by the United States)." FERC would
have no authority to issue a permit for the construction or
modification of an electric transmission facility within a state that is a
party to a compact, unless the members of the compact are in
373
disagreement and the Secretary makes certain findings.
So far, no states have entered into such compacts. But if states
were to do so, it could allow for better and more efficient planning and
construction of transmission lines, particularly regional transmission
372. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, § 216(i) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 824p (2006)).
373. Id. To override a state compact: (1) the states must disagree; (2) there must be "notice
and an opportunity for a hearing," 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i)(4) (2006); and (3) FERC must find that a
state commission or other entity that has authority to approve the siting of transmission lines
has withheld approval for more than one year or has conditioned its approval so the proposed
line will not significantly reduce transmission congestion or is not economically feasible. §
824p(b)(1)(C). This only applies to lines within a NIETC (just as FERC's general backstop siting
authority does).
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lines. Unfortunately, there are few successful models in this area for
states to follow. In one notable example, Congress granted states
power to site low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities
individually or through interstate compacts in the Low Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 and its 1985 Amendments
("LLW Act").3 7 4 States entering into compacts were required to develop
a siting plan with schedules and procedures for establishing a facility
location and preparing a license application.3 75 The states favored the
legislation as a means of retaining autonomy over the siting process
while overcoming existing obstacles to siting facilities on a state-bystate basis.37 6 After the LLW Act's enactment, many states entered
into compacts, but the process resulted in no new waste facilities. 377 In
the 1985 Amendments, Congress provided financial benefits to states
that met a series of siting deadlines, imposed increased disposal
charges and restrictions on states that missed the deadlines, and
required states that had not provided for disposal within a certain
time period to "take title" to the waste, thus assuming liability for any
associated damage. 378 In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court found the
"take title" provisions of the 1985 Amendments violated the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but upheld the remainder of the
statute.3 7 9 Since that time, despite the existence of interstate compacts
and the additional financial incentives provided in the 1985
Amendments, states individually and collectively have been unable to
site additional waste facilities, which has resulted in most nuclear
waste being stored where it is produced, raising local environmental
and public health concerns as well as national security concerns. 380
One can certainly argue that transmission lines, while not
generally welcome in a community, do not raise the same public
health, environmental, and safety concerns as nuclear waste facilities.
374. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (2006); see Ostrow, supra note 356, at 314 (explaining that
the LLW Act required states to dispose of waste and authorized states to enter into interstate
compacts to do so).
375. § 202 le(e)(1)(B)(i).
376. See Ostrow, supra note 356, at 314, 316 (explaining the development of the Act as a
response to the problems with only three states having LLW facilities, and noting that states
favored passage of the Act).
377. Id. at 314-15.
378. § 202le(d)-(e); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1994); Ostrow, supra
note 356, at 314-15.
379. New York, 505 U.S. at 145.
380. See Ostrow, supra note 356, at 316-17 ("[T]he Act's state-based approach to a national
siting problem failed to achieve its ultimate goal of ensuring the safe, nationwide disposal of
LLW as states, plagued by local opposition, refused to meet their voluntarily assumed compact
obligations.").
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Nevertheless, the difficulty that states have faced in siting
transmission lines during the past decades does raise questions over
whether an interstate compact approach will be effective without
significant financial incentives or penalties.
Another limitation of the interstate compact framework in the
EPAct 2005 is that regional transmission-siting agencies do not
possess eminent domain authority. Thus, even if a regional
transmission-siting agency approved a project, it would still have to
utilize state eminent domain authority to acquire easements from
potential "holdouts." A better solution would be to vest federal
eminent domain authority in the regional transmission-siting agency,
and streamline the siting process such that permits and approvals
obtained through the process also provide eminent domain authority
to the regional agency. This could potentially be a very strong
solution, as it would allow for concurrent planning and siting
authority at the level where transmission-facility management occurs,
similar to what happens within Texas. It also would more cleanly
address the "public need" for a line, as the public would be broadly
defined to include an interstate market rather than an intrastate
market.
B. Cost-Allocation Concerns
The question of cost allocation underlies virtually all debates
surrounding regulatory authority for siting interstate transmission
lines. Cost allocation, as former FERC Commissioner Joe Kelliher
noted, is "almost a uniquely American issue." 38 ' While the United
Kingdom has only one grid, and one owner, 382 the United States has
"eight or ten grids, eight or ten large regional machines that have
scores or hundreds of owners." 383 This creates problems with power
flow when any single component of the grid expands, as well as
difficulties with cost allocation and pricing. 384 In the United Kingdom
381. Former FERC Commissioner Kelliher Discusses New Transmission, Cost Allocation
Rule, E&E PUB., LLC (July 25, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/tv/transcript/1378. For a discussion
of postage stamp pricing, see supra note 285.
382. See Scott Butler, UK Electricity Networks: The Nature of UK Electricity Transmission
and Distribution Networks in an Intermittent Renewable and Embedded Electricity Generation
Future, at 32 (September 2001) (MSc Thesis, Imperial College of Science Technology and
Medicine), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/poste5.pdf (highlighting that
National Grid is statutorily charged with maintaining UK's high-voltage electricity grid).
383. Former FERC Commissioner Kelliher Discusses New Transmission, Cost Allocation
Rule, supra note 381.
384. Id.
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and parts of Europe, regulators have adjusted cost-allocation
structures so that the costs of new transmission are generally
"socialized" on a "postage-stamp" basis, particularly for renewable
38 5
energy-based projects.
In the United States, the biggest challenge of allocating
transmission costs arises in an interstate context. Although FERC has
issued orders requiring OATTs for transmission lines, it has largely
left the implementation of cost allocation for new transmission lines to
the regions. "Transmission cost allocation can be particularly
contentious for multi-state transmission projects that cross more than
one state, as the benefits of the proposed project may accrue unevenly
to market participants."' 38 6 Benefits may be hard to estimate, and some
entities may feel that they are paying more for a line than they will
gain in benefits. 38 7 Sometimes costs may be spread across a RTO, but
benefits might be conferred upon neighboring regions which do not
have to pay. 388 In light of this, different regions in the United States
have taken different approaches to allocating transmission costs for
large-scale transmission upgrades. Some simply have the project
sponsor pay the upfront capital expenditure, and allow for
transmission-access charges to recoup the costs. 38 9 Others, such as
PJM, have tried to argue that the benefits from reliability warrant
sharing costs across a region, but courts remain unconvinced.
As a result of the different regional approaches to cost
allocation, the United States has seen innovation in the field of
regional pricing. The most promising development has been the
recently approved MISO MVP plan. Building upon prior efforts by
regions such as PJM to expand cost allocation across regional
participants, MISO's MP plan recognizes that benefits accrue not
just due to reliability and economic impacts, but also due to the
385. See MARCELINO MADRIGAL & STEVEN STOFr, ENERGY AND MINING SECTOR BOARD
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 26, TRANSMISSION EXPANSION FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY SCALE-UP
EMERGING
LESSONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
17-20,
105-07
(2011),
available at

http://www.esmap.org/esmap/sites/esmap.org/files/DP%2026%20transmission%2 0expansion%20t
ext%209- 15-1lweb SMALL.pdf.
386. SARI FINK ET AL., NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, A SURVEY OF
TRANSMISSION COST ALLOCATION METHODOLOGIES FOR REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS

2 (2011), available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2011/finktransmission
_cost-allocation.pdf.
387. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing opposition in Michigan to transmission cost allocation
as Michigan is remote as compared to the rest of the region and may only use in-state renewable
energy sources to meet Michigan's RPS targets).
388. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing MISO's inability to allocate transmission costs to its
neighboring RTO, PJM, despite potential transmission benefits accruing to PJM).
389. See supra Part II.C (discussing the regions that have taken this particular approach).
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achievement of various state and regional policy goals and mandates
such as RPSs. By expressly considering such goals, MVP pricing
attempts to move beyond historical methods of allocating costs and
better align transmission line planning and cost allocation with statelevel renewable energy policies. Although the full impact of MVP cost
allocation remains to be seen, there is evidence of recent progress. The
seventeen "no regrets" transmission lines in the MISO region are
beginning construction. Not only did FERC approve the MISO AVVP
pricing, it endorsed similar cost-allocation principles on a nationwide
basis in Order 1000.390 As it stands, all indicators are that IVP
pricing may be the best plan to date to facilitate equitable
39 1
transmission line buildout and to meet renewable energy needs.
It should be noted, however, that the new MVP pricing and
Order 1000 face potential legal challenges, particularly the argument
that their allocations of costs are not commensurate with the benefits
various market participants receive. Drawing upon the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC,392 critics
contend that the relationship between the benefits various
transmission owners will receive and the costs they will bear is too
attenuated, and courts will reject it. However, as Judge Posner noted,
all that is required is "an articulable and plausible reason to believe
that the benefits are at least roughly commensurate with those
utilities' share of total electricity sales." 393 The MISO MVP project
developed and conducted a detailed cost-benefit analysis to evaluate
the state-level benefits of the new proposed lines.

390. Additionally, under the new rule FERC is now "requiring that regional cost allocation
be established outside of the RTO regions." Former FERC CommissionerKelliher Discusses New
Transmission, Cost Allocation Rule, supranote 381.
391. Another potential model is the Southwest Power Pool's ("SPP") "highway/byway"
approach to cost allocation that allows members to share the cost of lines across the region.
Under this approach, which FERC approved in 2010, costs are allocated according to the voltage
of the new transmission facilities. Costs of facilities operating at 300 kV and above are allocated
100% across the SPP region on a postage stamp basis. Costs of facilities operating above 100 kV
and below 300 kV are allocated one-third on a regional postage stamp basis and two-thirds to the
zone in which the facilities are located. The costs of facilities operating at or under 100 kV are
allocated fully to the zone in which the facilities are located. See FERC Approves SPP
Highway/Byway Cost Allocation Plan for High Voltage Transmission Lines, CLIMATE + ENERGY
PROJECT BLOG (June 17, 2010), http://blog.climateandenergy.org/2010/06/17/ferc-approves-spp-

highway-byway-cost-allocation-planl (describing the new plan).
392. 576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009).
393. Id. at 477; see also Evan Reese & Doug Smith, FERC Affirms MISO and SPP
Approaches

to

Transmission Cost

Allocation, VANNESS

FELDMAN

(October

24,

2011),

http://www.vnf.com/news-alerts-643.html (describing the holding from the case and its potential
implications for FERC).
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As Professor Jim Rossi has argued, the current state-by-state
394
siting approval process raises its own cost-allocation challenges.
When transmission siting is done on a state-by-state basis and many
state statutes direct state PUCs to consider the "need" for the line
based on benefits to in-state customers only, it becomes extremely
difficult politically, if not outright illegal, to site a line to export state
power to nearby population centers. 395 While some states, like North
Dakota, have long allowed out-of-state power needs to justify the
siting of a new line in the state, other states such as Massachusetts,
Mississippi, and Arizona have found to the contrary, explicitly
rejecting certificates of need and eminent domain authority for such
lines. 396 Moreover, as Professor Rossi and Ashley Brown, Executive
Director of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, have pointed out, to
the extent states fail to separate the questions of (1) whether to site
the line and (2) whether to pass the costs of the line on to ratepayers
in the state, both regulators and the public will continue to resist
approval of transmission lines designed primarily to provide power to
397
out-of-state customers.
This state-by-state approach also affects the selection of the
size of the transmission line, the architecture of the grid, and
ultimately the ability to develop large-scale renewable energy. While
larger, 765 kV, high-voltage transmission lines are more costly to
build, they use less land because they are able to carry four times the
electricity of 345 kV lines. 398 Gaining approval for infrastructure that
can allow for additional expansion of renewable energy beyond the
current policy mandates is difficult to justify at the state level. Thus,
any efforts to increase interstate transmission to improve grid
operation and promote the development and transport of renewable
energy must include a significant emphasis on developing new

394. See Rossi, supra note 17, 1018-23 (describing problems with the "status quo of state
transmission siting laws").
395. See id. at 1019-26 (describing state siting laws as concerned with the "interests within
individual states"); see also Pierce, Jr., supra note 147, at 179-83 (discussing the problem of
states considering only in-state benefits in reviewing interstate transmission projects, leading to
transmission bottlenecks across the country but particularly in the Northeast).
396. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 1022-26.
397. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 147, at 726-28 (noting that "the practice states have
historically used in allocating the costs of transmission has had a profound impact on siting lines
throughout the United States").
398. A 345 kV system requires a right of way of about 150 feet, a 765 kV line a right of way
of 200 feet, but the 765 kV line is able to carry four times more electricity. TJ Smith, Midwest
ISO, Presentation to Energy and Environmental Policy Course, University of Minnesota (Nov.
22, 2011).
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approaches to cost allocation, starting with and, likely, going beyond
the efforts described in this Article.
CONCLUSION

transmission infrastructure
Developing
the electricity
necessary to significantly increase renewable energy use in this
country is a challenge of massive proportions. While the technological
choices are well understood, implementing them requires policy
development and implementation on the state, regional, and federal
levels. Some states are rich in renewable resources and far exceed
their population-based electricity demand, while others are poor in
such resources and have significant population-based electricity
demand. Some states have developed more integrated and favorable
policies for renewable energy and transmission line development,
while others have resisted it. So far, Congress has refused to give
FERC or any other federal agency the authority to override state
obstacles to siting new transmission lines, and FERC itself has not
always used the tools it has to address the problem. As a result,
significant policy changes may be unlikely until the country or a
region of the country is faced with a large-scale transmission crisis.
This Article addresses the regional- and state-level challenges
of planning, siting, and paying for large-scale transmission lines to
support renewable energy development. If and how these decisions are
made will affect the future of renewable energy development and
shape the ability of grid operators to integrate these renewable
resources into the electricity system. This Article highlights current
state and regional efforts to create greater interstate transmission
capacity for renewable power. It shows that they may serve as models
for the increased collaboration required to create that capacity and
realize the attendant benefits. These developments illustrate how
states are attempting to serve as 'laboratories of democracy" in the
realm of interstate transmission; to achieve success, however, they
must do so cooperatively rather than independently.

